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Abstract
Legal systems in the post-Communist economies are not well adapted to a
market economy. This article uses the tools of law and economics to ana-
lyze contract, broadly defined to include all voluntary exchange agree-
ments. This article identifies real problems with this body of law,
problems that are most severe in Russia. This article makes three interre-
lated arguments. First, private mechanisms such as reputation and self-
enforcing agreements can be used to facilitate exchange. Second, govern-
ment can encourage the use of these mechanisms both to assist private
parties in engaging in exchange and to economize on government
resources. The most important such policy is a commitment by the gov-
ernment to enforce private arbitration decisions if parties voluntarily
agree to arbitration for dispute resolution. Third, government can incor-
porate the results of these private decision processes into the law when
legal code revisions occur. This article derives implications for efficient
behavior of governments, private arbitrators, attorneys, trade associations,
and private firms.
Introduction: The Problem Addressed
This article is a normative application of law and economics scholarship to
the problem of securing an efficient (wealth maximizing) method of
enforcing agreements and thus facilitating exchange in the post-Commu-
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nist countries.' This article does not set forth the detailed tenets of
explicit law; it is not useful or even possible for anyone to do so. Rather,
the reference in the title to "growing" is deliberate. This article discusses
state-adopted policies which allow the law to evolve efficiently. In this
scheme, no one need decide ex ante what the outcome of the process will
be. This article does, however, indicate some broad principles of efficient
contract law.2
While it is generally agreed that all law needs improvement in post-
Communist economies, most writing by economists on the "transition" has
concerned property law3 and has focussed on privatization.4 The major
controversy in this literature has been the optimal speed of adjustment:
Should there be a "big bang" (rapid immediate privatization), or should
the transition proceed at a more modest pace?5 Economists have devoted
relatively little scholarly attention to other branches of law.6
1. I deal specifically with Russia, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic, coun-
tries that I have visited. I believe, however, that the general principles discussed are
more widely applicable.
2. For a general discussion of what efficient contract law might look like, see RICH-
ARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW ch. 4 (4th ed. 1992); ROBERT D. CooTER &
THOMAS ULEN, LAw AND ECONOMICS chs. 6-7 (1988).
3. See, e.g., Christopher Clague, Introduction: TheJourney to a Market Economy, in THE
EMERGENCE OF MARKET ECONOMIES IN EASTERN EUROPE (Christopher Clague & Gordon
C. Rausser eds., 1992);Jfinos Kornai, The Postsocialist Transition and the State: Reflections in
the Light of Hungarian Fiscal Problems, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1992); John M. Litwack,
Legality and Market Reform in Soviet-Type Economies, 5 J. EcoN. PERsP. 77 (1991); Henry
Manne, Perestroika and the Limits of Knowledge, 11 CATOJ. 207 (1991); William Niskanen,
The Soft Infrastructure of a Market Economy, 11 CATO J. 233 (1991); Jan Svejnar,
Microeconomic Issues in the Transition to a Market Economy, 5 J. EcoN. PERSP. 123 (1991).
4. For a sampling of this literature, see THE EMERGENCE OF MARKET ECONOMIES IN
EASTERN EUROPE (Christopher Clague & Gordon C. Rausser eds., 1992); INVESTING IN
REFORM: DOING BusINEss IN A CHANGING SOVIET UNION (Michael P. Claudon & Tamar
L. Gutner eds., 1991); PRIVATIZATION Am ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN Posr-SoCLAUsT CouN-
TRIES: ECONOMY, LAw AND SOCITY (Bruno Dallago et al. eds., 1992); MAKING MARKETS.:
ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE Posr-Sovmr STATES (Shafiqual
Islam & Michael Mandelbaum eds., 1993); TIALS OF TRANSmON: ECONOMIC REFORM IN
THE FORMER COMMUNIST BLOCK (Michael Keren & Gur Ofer eds., 1992); 1 THE TRANsI-
TION TO A MARK=T ECONOMY. THE BROAD ISSUES (Paul Marer & Salvatore Zecchini eds.,
1991); THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE TRANSITON PROCESS IN EASTERN EUROPE (Laszlo
Samogyi ed., 1993).
5. For a non-technical discussion, see Peter Passell, Dr. Jeffrey Sachs, Shock Therapist,
N.Y. TIMES MAG.,June 27,1993, at 20. Anders Aslund and William D. Nordhaus, among
others, are advocates of a relatively fast "big bang." ANDERS AsLuND, POST-COMMUNIST
ECONOMIC REVOLUTIONs: How BIG A BANG? (1992); William D. Nordhaus et al., Do
Borders Matter? Soviet Economic Reform afler the Coup, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. AcMv-
rry 321 (1991). Peter Murrell, in several papers, has advocated a slower transition.
PETER MURRELL, CONSERVATIVE PoLIrlCAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE STRATEGY OF ECONOMIC
TRANSITION (IRIS, Univ. of Md., Working Paper No. 7, 1991); PETER MURRELL, EvOLU-
TIONARY AND RADICAL APPROACHES TO ECONOMIC REFORM (IRIS, Univ. of Md., Working
Paper No. 5, 1991); Peter Murrell, Evolution in Economics and in the Fxonomic Reform of the
Centrally Planned Economies, in THE EMERGENCE OF MARKET ECONOMIES IN EASTERN
EUROPE, supra note 4, at 35. Ronald McKinnon also has advocated a slower transition.
Ronald L McKinnon, Spontaneous Order on the Road Back From Socialism: An Asian Perspec-
tive, 82 AM. EcoN. REv. 31 (1992).
6. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF) ET AL, A STUY OF THE SovEr ECONOMY
249 (1991), indicates that "the civil dispute resolution system has, as yet, received lim-
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This article primarily concerns the law governing transactions and
exchange. This area of law is quite important. For example, Douglass
North, a leading economic historian studying growth of western econo-
mies, indicates: "How effectively agreements are enforced is the single
most important determinant of economic performance."7 This article also
considers property rights, particularly Russian property rights, where there
are particular difficulties in enforcing such rights.
"Transactions and exchange," in this context, mean more than "con-
tract" as defined in legal literature; they include the law dealing with all
voluntary agreements. Although this article focuses on contracts for
exchange of goods, the principles developed apply more broadly. Securi-
ties law, the law of secured property, labor law, and bankruptcy are all
areas where parties form voluntary agreements and where this article's
arguments are relevant. Indeed, even product liability law, commonly
treated as tort law, should be covered by contract.8
Contemporary western legal systems have erred by interfering exces-
sively with freedom of contract. For legal systems of newer economies
attempting to grow quickly, it is especially desirable not to commit similar
errors. For example, in the postwar period, the highly successful Erhard
reforms in Germany "paid remarkably little attention to equity considera-
tions. In marked contrast to the fashionable welfare state policies, the
Erhardian reforms... limit[ed] social concern to the provision of a mini-
mal, though comprehensive, social security net."9
Contract law is easier to reform than property law because the con-
tracting parties ex ante are engaged in a positive sum, cooperative game.
During the contract negotiation stage, the parties' interests are symmetric;
both seek the most efficient contract possible to maximize the surplus to
be divided between them. For example, the parties would be expected to
ited attention as a key component of basic market functions." In a series of articles,
Gray and co-authors have addressed issues of most kinds of law, including contract law,
in many Eastern European countries. See CHERYL W. GRAY, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR
PRIVATE SECrOR AcIvrily IN THE CzEcH Aum SLOVAK FEDERAL REPUBUC (World Bank
Working Paper, Wash., 1992) [hereinafter CZEcH AND SLOVAK REpuBucL]; CHEm W.
GRAY ET AL., LEGAL REFORM FOR HUNG AR's PRIVATE SECToR (World Bank Working
Paper, Wash., 1992) [hereinafter HuNGARY]; CHERYL W. GRAY ET AL., THE LEGAL FRAME-
WORK FOR PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT IN A TRANSITIONAL ECONOMY. THE CAsE OF
POLAND (World Bank Working Paper, Wash., 1991) [hereinafter POLAND]; Russell Pitt-
man, Some Critical Provisions in the Antimonopoly Laws of Central and Eastern Europ 26
INT'L LAw. 485 (1992).
7. Douglass North, Institutions, Ideology and Economic Performance, 11 CATO J. 477,
481 (1991) (discussing the value of both formal (legal) enforcement of agreements and
of informal mechanisms). For North's general view of the importance of institutions in
an economy, see DOUGLASS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND Eco-
NOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990).
8. PAUL H. RUBIN, TORT REFORM BY CoNTRAcT 78-79 (1993); George L. Priest, The
Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical Histoy of the Intellectual Foundations of Modem
Tort Law, 14J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985).
9. Holger Wolf, The Lucky Miracle.- Germany 1945-1951, in PoswfAR ECONOMIC
REcONsrxUarON AND LEssoNs FOR THE EAST TODAY 29, 37 (Rudiger Dornbsuch et al.
eds., 1993).
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agree that, in the event of breach caused by a preventable occurrence, the
party who could have most cheaply prevented the breach would be liable.
This allocation of fault will reduce the precautionary costs, therefore
increasing the amount to be divided between the parties. There may be
disputes about the division of surplus-the price term-but there will be
agreement on other terms.
Interests obviously diverge if there is a dispute under the contract, but
there is at least one point in time when the goals are in harmony. For
example, if there is a breach due to a preventable event, the parties may
have an interest-motivated factual dispute about who could have most
cheaply prevented the event. Nonetheless, if the parties sign a contract in
good faith, that is if neither party plans ex ante to break the contract, then
they also have identical ex ante interests in methods of settling disputes ex
post, when the contract has been broken. Both parties want the most effi-
cient dispute resolution mechanism because this, again, maximizes the ex
ante surplus to be divided between them. Once a dispute arises, parties'
wishes with respect to enforcement may differ, but there is a confluence of
interests at the time the agreement is signed.
This commonality of interests is generally much weaker or even lack-
ing in other bodies of law. For example, the interests of most players ini-
tially diverge in the creation of property rights in post-Communist
economies. Managers, workers, and ordinary citizens all want ownership
rights in existing businesses, and with respect to these rights, the distribu-
tion issue is purely competitive. Therefore, even though the creation of
property rights may result in substantial gains, it is difficult to form a coali-
tion favoring any one scheme. In tort law, the parties generally are stran-
gers before the accident occurs, so ex ante agreement is impossible. Once
the accident occurs, of course, interests are purely in conflict; each party
wants the other to bear the accident costs.10
Those interested in law reform can use the symmetry of interests in
contract to encourage efficient exchange and to design efficient contract
law. There are three related points whose elaboration forms this article's
core. First, in many cases, law itself will be unneccessary. Private parties
can use many available mechanisms to make agreements self-enforcing."
Second, the law can facilitate the use of these mechanisms. For example,
the law can enforce arbitration clauses in contracts if parties insert such
clauses.' 2 This will often result in dispute settlement without relying on
10. Robert C. Ellickson analyzes tortious disputes in a context of existing relation-
.ships, and shows that in this situation cooperation is possible and indeed is the normal
behavior observed. ROBERT C. ELUCxSON, ORDER WrrHotur LAw (1991). However, his
universe--disputes between adjacent landowners--is not typical of the normal tort con-
text, although it is typical of situations governed by nuisance law.
11. Paul H. Rubin, Private Mechanisms for Creation of Efficient Institutions for Market
Economies, in THE POLTmcAL ECONOMY OF THE TRANsmoN PROCESS IN EASTERN EUROPE,
supra note 4, at 158.
12. "Probably some combination of private adjudication with ultimate state author-
ity to back up its decisions is the most that a rapidly emerging free-market system can
hope for." Manne, supra note 3, at 213.
1994 Post-Communist Legal Systems
the scarce resources of the judicial system. Finally, public law can adopt
the rules developed privately by arbitrators and others. This will speed up
the development of the legal system and will ultimately lead to a more
efficient system.
A contract enforcement system is more valuable if property rights are
clearly defined. Well-defined rights facilitate exchange, and the value of
exchange increases with the value of the rights. Nonetheless, in designing
efficient contract law, it is not true that "everything depends on everything
else." It is possible to improve contract enforcement without other
improvements in the economy. Large amounts of exchange take place in
the post-Communist economies, even with the existing level of property
rights definitions. People are not self-sufficient. More efficient contract
law can facilitate the existing exchange and encourage additional welfare-
improving transactions, even under current circumstances.
As one Russian broker told the New York Times, "Russian businessmen
have gone ahead of the law, but goods have to move."13 This same story
indicates that "It] he free market, in effect, is not waiting for a legal system.
Deals march on, although the contracts that are bringing the new ventures
to life might be difficult to enforce."14 If these contracts were easier to
enforce, deals would "march on" faster and there would be more deals.
As privatization proceeds, more and more transactions will come
under the scope of contract principles. If mechanisms can be adopted
which allow contract law to develop efficiently, then the law can evolve
with the economy. The law can be useful and valuable at each step in the
process and if the law becomes more efficient it will become more
valuable.
Similarly, the process described here can proceed independent of the
rate of privatization. Efficient contract law may be desirable in any eco-
nomic or governmental system. More transactions will be covered by con-
tract if the process of adjustment is rapid than if the process is slow. In
either case, however, the principles identified here are applicable.
Indeed, there are even incentives for dictatorships to design efficient prin-
ciples of private exchange. Therefore, even if democracy should not sur-
vive in some countries, the principles discussed here might be relevant for
policy makers.15 Indeed, even Communist countries have incentives for
efficient contract law.' 6
One alternative to this article's proposal for the law's gradual evolu-
tion is a method of transforming contract law analogous to the "big bang."
13. Lewis Uchitelle, The Art of a Russian Deak Ad-Libbing Contract Law, N.Y. TmEs,
Jan. 17, 1992, at Al.
14. Id.
15. See MANcuR OLSON, AuTocRcv, D~mocRAcY AND IhsromR WrrH AN APPDmix:
AN ABsrRAcr MODEL OF AuTocRA-rc VERSus DocRA-rc GovumENT (IRIS, Univ. of
Md., Working Paper No. 22, 1991). Olson claims, however, that democracies have
stronger incentives, because efficient rights are relatively more valuable in democracies.
I
16. Heidi Kroll, Breach of Contract in the Soviet Economy, 16J. Lzc.AL STUD. 119, 124
(1987).
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Some have suggested that the post-Communist economies should adopt
wholesale the commercial code of an existing market economy. 17 Other
post-Communist economies may attempt to draft such a body of law de
novo. In the next section, this article discusses these proposals and indi-
cates why neither is desirable. This article also discusses the major alterna-
tive method of legal change: the adoption by legislatures of civil codes.
While the countries of interest are generally code countries, there are
some advantages to a common law process. One option would use a com-
mon law process until the laws and the underlying political systems have
reached some level of equilibrium. There are advantages to a private as
opposed to a public common law process if this option is chosen.
In Part U, this article discusses the economics of contract law. An
important function of this law is to reduce opportunism. This article first
discusses the theory of opportunistic behavior. It also provides some evi-
dence that opportunistic behavior is occurring in the post-Communist
economies.
There are private mechanisms available to individuals to avoid oppor-
tunism. These mechanisms are analyzed in Part III. It is useful to charac-
terize them as "unilateral," actions a single party can take to certify his
reputation, "bilateral," actions two parties can jointly take to guarantee
that neither will victimize the other, and "multilateral," actions a group
can jointly undertake to guarantee their reputations. This article also dis-
cusses the limits to private actions in this section.
In Part IV, this article discusses in more detail the present legal situa-
tion in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Russia. In the first
three countries, while the relevant law is flawed and incomplete, there is a
sound body of commercial law in place. The law in Russia, in contrast, is
much weaker and much more work is needed. Many of the problems
seem to stem from insufficient central government power, so that differing
levels of government cannot commit to honor agreements and the central
government cannot force them to commit. This article also discusses
some institutions in the post-Communist countries that already undertake
the private functions discussed above, or that are in a position to begin to
do so.
Part V examines government policy that can facilitate the design of
efficient transactional rules. It is useful to consider policy with respect to
unilateral, bilateral and multilateral mechanisms. Policies are both posi-
tive and negative. Governments should do some things to facilitate
exchange, and should refrain from doing things that hinder exchange.
This article discusses both kinds of policies.
Part VI relates the informal mechanisms explained earlier and the
evolution process of efficient rules. The conclusion is that a combination
of formal and informal mechanisms may be the fastest way to achieve
these rules. For example, legal code drafters can incorporate lessons
17. See, e.g., Rudiger Dornbusch, Strategies and Pioitiesfor Reforn, in 1 THE TRANsi.
TION TO A MARKEr ECONOMY. THE BRoAD Issuts, supra note 4, at 169.
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learned about efficient law from the informal mechanisms into code
revisions.
Part VII summarizes this article's implications. These include implica-
tions for the behavior of governments, arbitrators, private trade associa-
tions, private attorneys, and businesses.
I. Alternative Methods of Legal Change
In this section, this article discusses the major alternatives to a common
law, evolutionary process for legal change. These include a "big bang" for
contract law and the use of a civil code instead of a common law process.
This article also discusses private and public law.
A. A "Big Bang" For Contract Law?
There are equivalents in contract law to the big bang proposals for rapid
privatization of property. One is the suggestion that post-Communist
economies adopt entirely the civil code of a capitalist economy. Rudiger
Dornbusch, for example, argues that establishing institutions, including a
legal system, is second priority to establishing the "rules of the game," that
is private property rights and freedom to transact. He suggests that coun-
tries should adopt the entire civil code, including corporate law, from a
country such as Finland or the Netherlands. 18
Such a code would be difficult to interpret for an economy with no
market tradition. Indeed, even translating the terms from Finnish or
Dutch into Russian or Polish would be difficult Many terms are defined
only by their use in a market economy and in actual existing transactions
and decisions. Bruno Leoni states that these translation difficulties arise
because words are rooted in institutions that may be lacking in the second
culture. 19 Leoni's discussion applies to translations between languages
used in relatively free economies. These problems would be exacerbated
in translating terms used in market economies to languages spoken in
societies that have not had markets, and the corresponding institutions,
for many years. Peter Murrell similarly suggests that a legal code is embed-
ded with large amounts of practical knowledge, so a transfer would not be
feasible.2 0
Leoni also notes that similar words may actually have different mean-
ings in different legal cultures.2 ' For example, the Russian "Arbitration
Court" is the general court with business jurisdiction; the term "arbitra-
18. Id. See also Axel Leijonhufvud, Problems of Socialist Transition: Kazakhstan 1991, in
THz PoLricAL EcoNOMY OF THE TRANSITION PROCESS iN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 4,
at 289, 304.
19. BRUNO LEoNi, FREEDOM AND Tm LAw 30 (1991).
20. MURRET, CONSERVATIVE PoLrITCa. PHLOSOPHYAND THE STRATEGY OF EcONOMc
TRANsrnON, supra note 5, at 5. It has been suggested that a country could importjudges
and lawyers to operate such a code. This might solve some of the problems, but does
not seem a practical alternative. Moreover, language problems would persist.
21. LEoN!, supra note 19, at 30.
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tion" is not the same as "arbitration" in English.22 "Commercial bank,"
"leaseholding property," and "stockholding" all have different meanings in
Russian law than in other jurisdictions. 2 3 There are undoubtedly addi-
tional such inconsistencies; if they were found after a code's adoption,
substantial problems could result.
It takes three years for an American college graduate (who has grown
up in a market economy) to learn, in law school, the meaning of United
States law, and even longer until this knowledge is practically useful. Busi-
nessmen must then rely on discussions with trained attorneys for the law to
affect their behavior. To expect this to occur simply by adopting an
existing code is unrealistic. On the other hand, it would be reasonable for
authorities to adopt portions of existing legal codes, as long as they made
sure that these parts made sense in the adopting country and were consis-
tent with existing law.
Similarly, it would not be feasible for authorities to generate an entire
body of contract law de novo. Reliance on "top down" law will not work;
laws passed by the legislature are often filled with loopholes and are inter-
nally inconsistent.24 While these problems are not necessarily a result of
incorrect drafting by the legislature, contract law is, in some sense, organi-
cally grown over a long period of time. It has numerous components that
must interact with each other and with other large complex bodies of law
such as securities law, corporate law, and labor law, to name only a few. As
Friedrich Hayek says, "[t]he parts of a legal system are not so much
adjusted to each other according to a comprehensive overall view, as grad-
ually adapted to each other by the successive application of general princi-
ples to particular problems .... "25 Laws must also be consistent with
existing institutions in an economy. For example, Allan Schmid points
out that contract law may adopt one set of risk sharing doctrines in a world
where market insurance is freely available, but these institutions may not
be desirable if such insurance markets are lacking.26 For anyone or any
group to be able to craft such a body of law is as likely as for a decision
maker to be able to design a complex economy de novo. It is of course the
impossibility of this task that has caused the current situation in the rele-
vant economies.
When a complex statute, such as the recently approved Americans
with Disabilities Act,2 7 is adopted in the United States, it commonly takes
22. MARK TouRuvsiu & En..EN MORGAN, CUMNG THE RFD TAPE: How WESTERN
CoMsA'Mms CAN PRovrr rN Tim NEW RussIA 167 (1993).
23. Id.
24. Kathryn Hendley, Legal Development and Privatization in Russia: A Case Study, 8
Sovrr ECoN. 130, 131 (1992).
25. 1 FE'DPicH A. HAYE, LAW, LEGISLATION AND Lm.. Ru.us AND ORDER 65
(1973).
26. A. Allan Schmid, Legal Foundations of the Market: Iraplications for the Formerly Social
ist Countries of Eastern Europe and Afiica, 26 J. EcoN. IssuEs 707 (1992).
27. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12112).
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years of litigation before its meaning becomes fully clear.28 While some
blame this on the legislature's poor drafting and on the legal ambiguities
inserted to please various interest groups, it is also true that no one can ex
ante predict fully the meaning of such a major legal change and its rela-
tionship with other law. If American lawmakers with large staffs of exper-
ienced professional lawyers and input from many others cannot fully
predict the implications of only one statute, how could we expect Russian
or Polish lawmakers lacking experience in a private law environment to be
able to craft an entire code?29
Finally, those who advocate another body of law's wholesale adoption
appear to believe that the relevant countries were indeed starting from a
position of no law. As I argue later, no country is in this position. All have
some sort of pre-existing contract law. Therefore, the choice is not
between starting de novo or adopting a body of law. Rather, the choice is
between modifying an existing body of law or adopting some other body
of law. Even if some other country's law were adopted, it would require
modification to tailor the law to local conditions such as many years with-
out market institutions. Thus, in either case, the issue is finding the most
efficient method to modify some currently maladapted law. This paper's
proposals are useful for adapting a body of law, whatever its original
source.
B. Common Law or Civil Code?
The two major methods of deriving the law governing private relations
(property, contracts, tort) are common law and civil codes. Codes are
largely passed by legislatures; common law is mostly judge-made law. In
general, Britain and its former colonies, including the United States, use
common law; most of the rest of the world uses legislative codes. The post-
Communist countries are therefore basically code countries. Nonetheless,
I argue here for at least a temporary use of common-law principles in
these countries.
Hayek made a major theoretical argument in favor of common law.30
Richard Posner has also made such arguments. 31 This author has pro-
vided a mechanism that would lead to common law efficiency.3 2 Gerald
Scully summarizes this analysis.33 Here, this article makes a more limited
claim. I argue that, for the conditions in which the post-Communist coun-
tries now find themselves, a reliance, for a time, on common law-like
processes would be useful. This reliance would not preclude the use of
codes, but, this article contends, would be a useful supplement. Indeed,
28. Julie C. Janofsky, Whoever Wrote the ADA Regs Never Ran a Business, WAmL ST. J.,
Mar. 15, 1993, at A12.
29. See Daniel T. Ostas, Institutional Reform in East-Cetral Europe: Hungarian and
Polish Contract Law, 26J. ECON. Issuts 513 (1992).
30. HAYmi, supra note 25.
31. PosNm, supra note 2.
32. Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Eficient?, 6J. LGAL STUD. 51 (1977).
33. GmwAmu W. SCuLLY, CONS-rrUTONAL EmvmoNmrs A ECONomic GRowrH ch.
6 (1992).
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this article maintains below that a private common law-like process would
be even more useful.
The code drafting process generally requires several valuable inputs.
In particular, skilled lawyers (often, in advanced countries, academic law-
yers) and the legislature's time are the major inputs. Generally, a commis-
sion of attorneys will draft a proposed code that will be submitted to the
legislature. The legislature will then request comments from interested
and politically relevant parties. This process may go through several itera-
tions. In contrast, common law decisions are by-products of the dispute
resolution process. The argument here is that the relative price of legisla-
tors and skilled lawyers is higher in post-Communist countries than else-
where. Thus, whatever the optimal balance between common law and
code may be in more settled countries, the optimal mix is more towards a
common law process in the newer economies.
Consider first the input of lawyers. To draft a code requires a lawyer
with knowledge of local conditions and laws but also with knowledge of
western capitalist law. Obviously, law schools in Communist regimes did
not specialize in training such attorneys, and there are relatively few of
them. Moreover, their scarcity means that today such attorneys have a
high opportunity cost. Code drafting is not a high paid occupation; it is
commonly done as part of academic responsibility. Governments in all of
the studied countries are short of funds and cannot pay high wages to
attorneys to draft such codes. Private attorneys might not refuse if asked
to serve on code-drafting commissions, but they would likely take longer to
provide a draft. Thus, the first input into code drafting, attorney time,
seems scarcer in the post-Communist economies than would be true at an
equilibrium.
Legislator time is also scarce. The relevant countries are in the pro-
cess of creating new economic, political and social orders. For such
efforts, new laws and legislation are necessary. For example, privatization
is itself a major change requiring substantial legislative input. In Russia, as
this article is written, there has been a major political battle between the
legislature and President Yeltsin over constitutional provisions, and legal
changes in codes are not high on the political agenda. Once this dispute
is resolved, the Russian legislature, in whatever form it emerges, will be
busy with major political decisions, such as determining the role of the
various geographic and ethnic components in the new state. Again, this
means that if a commission proposes a code, the legislature is likely to take
a longer time in responding to it than otherwise.
Boris Topornin, Director of the Institute of State and Law of the Rus-
sia Academy of Sciences, has addressed this issue. He indicated that the
"first generation" of Russian laws, adopted in December 1990, were "insuf-
34. I met with many such attorneys in several countries. Almost all were associated
with major American law firms, and many who were not seemed able to engage in
significant amounts of consulting for foreign businesses. Others seemed to be in pres-
tigious positions with important government ministries.
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ficiently clear" and "insufficiently systematic."3 5 In general, Topornin
asserted that current Russian law is inadequate, and that during the transi-
tion it will be necessary to change the law rapidly. 6 However, as of now
(November 1993) the first generation of laws is still governing in Russia.
The legislature simply has been unable to pass a "second generation."
Although Topornin indicated that Russian law is fundamentally a code
system, he also agrees that it might be possible to "us [e] the experience of
the common law."37 While he may be referring to the results of the com-
mon law process, using the actual process itself during the transition
might not be inconsistent with his arguments.
A major benefit of the common law process is that decisions and legal
change occur as a byproduct of dispute resolution. Whenever an appel-
late court settles a dispute, new law is made (if there is a written opinion).
Because courts naturally settle disputes, generating common law is rela-
tively cheap. The only cost is that of writing an opinion, as compared with
merely providing a decision.
We may view the tradeoff between code systems and common law sys-
tems in terms of the law's adaptation rate to changing conditions. Ideally,
a code achieves the optimum set of laws when it is first adopted. In con-
trast, the common law never reaches optimality. As soon as a code is
passed, however, it begins to become obsolete, and its maladaption
becomes larger until a new code is adopted. The common law, on the
other hand, is always somewhat maladapted, but its lack of adaptation is
limited because it is continually changing. In deciding which form of law
is most desirable, a country must balance these two kinds of costs. Since
the adoption of new codes takes relatively longer in countries in legal dis-
array (such as the new economies) than in countries in equilibrium, the
optimal balance would shift towards a common law solution.
While a shift to a common law process would be a change for legal
systems not accustomed to such a process, the change need not be perma-
nent. For example, legislatures could announce that appellate court ul-
ings would be enforced as law until a new codification of the relevant body
of law could be passed. These decisions could then be an input in the
codification process, but only one input. Such a system would allow some
of the benefits of a common law process without eliminating the relevant
countries' legal traditions.
C. Private Law or Public Law?
An even simpler reform would rely on a private common law system.
Indeed, such a system could possibly be established with minimal state
intervention. The state would need to agree to enforce arbitration deci-
sions. Actual enforcement would seldom be required if it were well known
that the state would enforce such decisions. Most parties will pay if they
35. B.N. ToPoRNiN, Ti cAL. PROBLEMS oF ECONoMIc REFORM IN RussiA 19
(1993).
36. Id. at 25.
37. Id. at 34.
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know that the sheriff, or the Russian equivalent, will attach their assets if
they fail to do so. If such enforcement were available, arbitrators, or
associations of arbitrators, could announce that they planned to establish
a common law-like system and follow precedent in decision making.
Such a system would create some difficulties. In particular, once the
precedent system became established, parties would generally not rely on
the arbitrators. Just as most disputes under a common law system settle
"out of court," so would we expect most disputes under an arbitration sys-
tem with a body of common law precedents to settle without a formal
hearing. This problem could be easily solved, however. The arbitration
association could charge a fee for being named in an agreement as the
final arbitrator of potential disputes.3 8 It would refuse to arbitrate any
dispute between parties who had not named it as the final authority. In
this way, the arbitration association could be compensated for the public
good provided when decisions were written.
Later, this article discusses some benefits of arbitration. Many bene-
fits arise, however, because the courts in many relevant countries are in
some disarray. The lack of skilled personnel-lawyers and judges-for
dealing with commercial dispute resolution and contract enforcement is a
major problem. This is because of inexperience with appropriate law and
institutions. While the main contract law principles in many relevant
countries are consistent with a market economy, the "broad general prin-
ciples have never applied directly to contracts between enterprises
involved in the planning process."3 9 Thus, as one study concludes, "the
civil courts have a very limited experience of commercial disputes, and
almost no experience with the resolution of complex business matters."
40
Although current judges do not have the needed experience, "[t]o date,
no substantial steps have been undertaken that will provide training to
judges on the handling of complex commercial cases and there have been
no plans announced for the hiring and training of the large number of
new judges and other personnel that will be needed as the burden on the
civil dispute-resolution system expands."4 ' Moreover, business operators
and even lawyers are not "contract literate" because of the nature of the
Soviet system. In the Soviet system, although some contract law existed, it
was of a different form than is needed in a market economy.
Russian courts currently lack sufficient power.42 Janos Kornai indi-
cates that Hungarian courts lack experience with a market economy and
sufficient resources to adjudicate all disputes that arise in a market econ-
omy.43 Cheryl Gray, in her discussions of law in Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic indicates that, in all cases, trained judges are lacking, and
that both the legal system and the population at large lack experience in a
38. BRUCE L. BENSON, TmE ENm_.PRISE oF LAw (1990).
39. IMF, supra note 6, at 247.
40. Id. at 251.
41. Id. at 255.
42. Hendley, supra note 24, at 153.
43. Kornai, supra note 3, at 3.
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market economy.44 Anders Aslund is even more pessimistic: "To require
the state to do anything means to ask the uninformed and corrupt for
assistance .... Therefore, the only defensible recommendation is that the
role of the state should be limited to a bare minimum in the period of
transition to capitalism."4 5
The current situation in Hungary seems to have improved. Judges'
salaries have recently been raised, and apparently well qualified people are
becoming and remaining judges. On the other hand, salaries for Polish
judges are low. Moreover, after three years, a judge can become a barris-
ter, a much more lucrative position, so many judges leave the bench at this
time. While the possibility of becoming a barrister may attract better qual-
ified individuals to the bench, the net result will be less experienced
judges.
Thus, there are severe difficulties in drafting and enforcing public law
for contract enforcement. Moreover, the skilled resources needed for this
project might be better employed elsewhere. This is particularly true
because private mechanisms could go a fair way towards creating such law.
The proposals set forth here rely much less on a formal judiciary than do
proposals for more explicit public law, and they may be easier to begin
applying.
11. Purpose of Contract Enforcement
The key class of problems facing potential traders in a world with no legal
contract enforcement are caused by opportunism. 46 This article first dis-
cusses this problem's theoretical nature, and then presents some evidence
of the problem's existence in the post-Communist countries.
A. Opportunism: Theory
In many transactions, one party performs his part of the deal before the
other, who then has an incentive to cheat. One key purpose of contract
law is to discourage such opportunism. 47 Examples of opportunism can
be as crude as a simple refusal to make an agreed upon payment. More
sophisticated forms of cheating include offering high quality goods for
sale and delivering low quality.48 A firm may also make a trading partner
dependent on the firm for some input, and then raise its price; this action
is called a "holdup." The general form of opportunism is appropriating
44. POLAND, supra note 6, at 27-28; CzEcH AND SLOVAK REPUBuC, supra note 6, at 24;
HUNGARY, supra note 6, at 42-44.
45. ASLUND, supra note 5, at 21.
46. See generally OLvEr E. Wn.UmsoN, THE ECONOMIC INsrrrurnoNs OF CAPrTAUSM
(1987); PAUL H. RUBiN, MANAGING BusIss TRa.SACnONS: CONrOLLING THE COsrS OF
COORDINATMNG, COMMUNICATING AND DECISION MAKING (1990).
47. TimothyJ. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REv.
521, 529 (1981).
48. George A. Akerlof, The Market For Lemons: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanim, 84 QJ. ECON. 488, 490 (1970).
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the "quasi-rents" associated with some transaction. 49
The main cost of opportunism, when it cannot effectively be pre-
vented, is neither the cost of cheating, nor even the precautionary cost
taken to avoid being victimized. Rather, it is the lost social value from the
otherwise profitable deals that are not made. For example, in economies
with no contractual possibilities, transactors often deal with long-term
associates or relatives for additional contractual performance assur-
ances.50 But this means that many potential transactions will not occur
because otherwise suitable parties lack the appropriate relationships and
so cannot guarantee performance, even though such transactions would
be value increasing. Similarly, if sellers cannot credibly promise to deliver
high quality goods, then consumers will not be willing to pay a higher
price for alleged higher quality, and manufacturers will therefore not pro-
duce it.
Lack of contractual enforcement mechanisms leads to another cost in
the post-Communist economies. As Ronald Coase long ago pointed out, if
transaction costs between firms are high, then more activity will occur
within the firm and less in markets. 51 But lack of enforcement mecha-
nisms means that firms will be relatively larger because they will internalize
more functions. Many authorities have remarked on the inefficiently
large size of firms in these economies and have argued for breaking these
firms into smaller parts. Until efficient contract enforcement mechanisms
are available, however, the incentive for such restructuring will be
reduced; managers can anticipate difficulties in using external contracts to
achieve the coordination that they now achieve by internal command.
In general, less formal enforcement mechanisms can work better for
shorter term transactions and for transactions involving smaller amounts
of money. As the contract's time horizon becomes longer or the amount
at issue becomes larger, the value of formal enforcement increases. Thus,
an additional cost of lack of enforcement mechanisms is the loss of long
term investments and large investments deterred by the lack of enforce-
ability. Social wealth can be greatly increased to the extent that mecha-
nisms can be designed and adopted to reduce or eliminate opportunism.
49. Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive
Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 298 (1978).
50. Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the EthnicaUy Homogeneous Middleman Group: An Insti-
tutionalAlternative to Contract Law, 10J. LEAI.L STuD. 349, 350 (1981). For an interesting
formal model of an ethnically based trading network with enforcement mechanisms,
see Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The
Maghribi Traders Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. Ruv. 525 (1993). The Maghribi were llth-
century Jewish traders in the Mediterranean.
51. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature ofthe Firr, EcoNoMicA 4 (n.s. 1937), reprinted in R.
H. CoASE, THE FnM tm MAmAND rm LAw 33-55 (1988). Benjamin Klein and his
co-authors are partly responsible for the analysis of this insight on vertical integration.
See Klein et al., supra note 49. See also W=AmsoN, supra note 46, at 39; RunrN, supra
note 46.
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B. Opportunism: Evidence
These problems all exist to a greater or lesser extent in the post-Commu-
nist economies. During the Communist period, informal small scale trad-
ing networks based on family, ethnicity, friendship, reciprocity, long term
obligations, and barter supported trade.52 Personal relations and trust
remain important because contracts cannot be enforced through the legal
system.5 3 The importance of personal contacts in supporting exchange in
Russia is a major theme of Mark Tourevski and Eileen Morgan, whose writ-
ings provide practical advice to western businessmen considering investing
in Russia. For example, "[t]he crucial impact on the business sphere will
still be the impact of the importance of the business connections with its
system."54 Such networks are of substantial importance principally where
possibilities for more formal governance mechanisms are limited.
There is evidence that inferior quality goods are produced in post-
Communist economies. 55 There is no recourse for disgruntled consum-
ers, unhappy with the quality of these goods.5 6 Courts deal primarily with
criminal matters, and thus cannot handle a large increase in complex civil
litigation engendered by cooperatives (Russian private firms) and private
markets. In one survey, 44% of respondents complained of the low quality
of goods and services produced by cooperatives. 57 If these respondents
meant that they would be willing to pay higher prices for higher quality, a
fact we cannot learn from the reported question, then this would indicate
a market failure. Paul Goldberg discusses quality efforts in consumer and
other markets.58 He mentions several new legislative proposals, currently
under consideration, for increasing quality. However, none of these
involves proper incentives, and none creates proper reputation effects.
Reliance on legislation to achieve goals that markets can better accom-
plish is evidence of a carryover of thought processes from the previous
economic system.
One major survey found people in ex-Communist societies to be less
confident about the future and more likely to believe that institutions are
52. Maria Los, From Underground to Legitimacy: The NormativeDilemmas of Post-Commu-
nist Marketization, in PRIVATIZATION AND ENRPRENEuRsHM iN PoST-SoCLAUsr CoUN-
Tras: EcoNoMY, LAW AND SocIET, supra note 4, at 111.
53. SimonJohnson & Heidi Kroll, Managerial StrategiesforSpontaneous Piivatization, 7
Sovrr EcoN. 281, 310 (1991).
54. ToumsKI & MORGAN, supra note 22, at 8.
55. See, eg., Louise I. Shelley, Entrepreneurship: Some Legal and Social Problems, in
PRavATIZATION AND ENTRFPRENEuRsmP rn Posr-SocAwsr CouNTeRIs: EcoNoMY, LAw
AN Socim'y, supra note 4; Ruud Knaack, On the Effiency of Soviet Cooperatives: A Critical
Appraisal, in PRIVArIZATION AND E-TR zNzunsHw IN Posr-SoCUAuT CoUNmUES: EcoN-
oMY, LAw Amw SocIwn', supra note 4. See Paul Goldberg, Economic Reform and Product
Quality Improvement Efforts in the Soviet Union, 44 Sovmr STUD. 113 (1992).
56. Louise I. Shelley, Entrepreneurship: Some Legal and Social Problems, in PRivATIZ-
TION AND EN'm-rENuasHun iN Posr-SocaA=sr CoUNTRIES: EcoNoMY, LAw AND Soci-
e', supra note 4, at 308.
57. Ruud Knaack, On the Efficiencj of Soviet Cooperatives: A Critical Appraisal, in PUVA-
TZATxON AND ENTREm'NEuasn'p iN Pos'r-SocuAusr CouqTlEs: EcoNoMY, LAw Am
Socrz'n, supra note 4, at 343.
58. Goldberg, supra note 55, at 113.
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likely to change than people in capitalist societies.5 9 This would explain
in part the unwillingness of firms' owners to invest in brand name capital
and is consistent with other behavior, discussed in more detail later, as
well.
Gary Burandt reports that an American firm was induced to invest in
developing a promotional program involving the Soviet Space Station
based on assurances that a particular Russian group had exclusive promo-
tional rights.6 0 The rights did not belong to the group, and the results of
the promotion campaign were appropriated with no compensation.
Burandt suggests that this occurred because of business practice ignorance
rather than intentional dishonesty, but the behavior is consistent with
opportunism.
Foreign businessmen indicate that, in doing business in Eastern
Europe, they are cautious. For example, a firm will take longer to do ajob
so that less investment is at risk. It will also move more slowly in working
with partners and subcontractors than would be true in a world with more
legal certainty. Many foreign firms are investing in distribution networks
in these countries, but not in manufacturing capacity. The fear of invest-
ment loss is a principal reason for this.
There is even evidence of opportunism in its simplest forms. Firms in
Russia sometimes take money and provide nothing; at other times, they
accept goods and then do not pay. Enforcement in even these cases is
apparently difficult.6 1 Lewis Uchitelle indicates that buyers operating on
commodity exchanges often renege.62 In Hungary, two-thirds of the
700,000 lawsuits filed in 1991 involved debt collection.63 Indeed, the most
significant form of opportunism in the post-Communist societies may be
simple failure to pay debts. In Hungary, creditors can use bankruptcy law
for debt collection, but such mechanisms are less developed in other
countries. 64
There is also evidence that the structure of new private firms partly
reflects uncertainty about contract enforcement. Many new firms in Rus-
sia are forming holding companies or using vertical integration to guaran-
tee needed supplies. Indeed, one "consultant" claimed that this was the
motivation for organizing a large firm containing many otherwise
independent firms.65 Many new firms are associated with existing state
firms, again to obtain contractual performance guarantees. 66
59. RobertJ. Shiller et al., Hunting for Homo Sovieticus: Situational Versus Attitudinal
Factors in Economic Behavior, 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EcoN. Acnvrr 127 (1992).
60. GARY BuRAiNDT, Moscow MEETS MADISON AVENUE: THE ADVENTUREs OF THE
Fmsr ADMAN IN TiE U.S.S.R. 92 (1992).
61. See, e.g., AlexanderJ. Buyevich & Sergey N. Zhukov, Dispute Resolution in Russia;
in LAW OF THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES: THE BoTroM LINE 11 (1992).
62. Uchitelle, supra note 13, at A10.
63. HuNGARY, supra note 6, at 44.
64. The Czech Republic has just passed a bankruptcy law, but it is too early to deter-
mine if this will be effective as a debt collection mechanism.
65. Johnson & Kroll, supra note 53, at 293.
66. d. at 303.
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1I. Private Mechanisms
Anthony Kronman examined the possibility of exchange in a regime with
no legal contract enforcement, a "state of nature."6 7 He identified several
mechanisms that parties could use to facilitate exchange in such a regime.
To a certain extent, conditions in the post-Communist economies repre-
sent a state of nature. Even in developed countries, explicit enforceable
and enforced contracts are relatively unimportant for much exchange. To
the extent possible-and it is a large extent-businesses rely on agree-
ments and do not use enforceable contracts. 68 In the United States, 75%
of commercial disputes are settled privately through arbitration and medi-
ation.69 Moreover, most potential "disputes" never even reach this stage.
Thus, the lack of enforceability in many circumstances will present less of
a problem and imply less difference between developed and new econo-
mies than might appear. However, businesses in developed economies
have learned, perhaps through trial and error, to do substantial business
without relying on contracts. Of course, some disagreements are not liti-
gated because parties know what the results would be. The enforcement
system's existence thus facilitates settlement without use of the system.
Businesses in new economies will have less experience with such
techniques.
This article deals in part with private mechanisms for solving the
problems associated with opportunism in transactions. Private mecha-
nisms are limited in their power; they cannot achieve an optimum. With-
out efficient government enforcement, it will be impossible to realize all
potential gains from trade. For example, long term investments and large
investments may be particularly discouraged when contract enforcement is
uncertain. 70 Thus, the arguments advanced here can be viewed as second
best approaches to efficient transacting where the state does not efficiently
enforce contracts.
On the other hand, it is possible to underestimate the power of such
mechanisms. Olson discusses trade in Communist regimes between man-
agers where markets were explicitly illegal.7 1 He indicates that reputations
and self-enforcing agreements were possible and useful to a certain extent,
but less efficient than state enforcement.72 In a world where trade is legal
67. Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and the State ofNatur, 1 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 5
(1985).
68. Bruce L. Benson, The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law, 55 S. EcoN.J. 644,
660-61 (1989); BENSON, supra note 38; Bruce L. Benson, Customary Law as Social Contract:
International Commercial La, 3 CONST. Poi- ECON. 1, 2 (1992); Kronman, supra note 67;
Stuart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55 (1963);
RuBiN, supra note 46; Lester Telser, A Theory of SefEnforcingAgreements, 53J. Bus. 27, 28
(1980); WnL-i soN, supra note 46, at 32.
69. BENSON, supra note 38, at 2.
70. "Without solid contract law, it is a rare business executive, Russian or foreign,
who is willing to risk investing, say, $100 million to construct a modem appliance fac-
tory that will not generate revenue for a year." Uchitelle, supra note 13, at Al.
71. Mancur Olson, The Hidden Path to a Successfid Economy, in THE EMF.RGENCE OF
MARKET ECONOMIES IN EAsmau EUROPE, supra note 4, at 55-75.
72. Id.
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but contracts are not enforced, however, there are more possibilities than
in a world where trade is illegal. This is because agents need not rely only
on secret mechanisms. For example, reputations can become public
knowledge, giving much more power to these mechanisims. 73 Olson's
point is still correct, but some deals will be completed under current con-
ditions that could not have been achieved under full Communism.
There are three classes of private mechanisms to make agreements
credible. All three rely on reputations. This article now discusses these
mechanisms.74
A. Unilateral Mechanisms
These are mechanisms that one firm can unilaterally use to keep itself
from cheating. Firms selling consumer goods represent a common appli-
cation of unilateral mechanisms. Sellers can be manufacturers, who will
create reputations in their product's brand name, or retailers, who will
create reputations in their store's name. The general principle-that rep-
utations can guarantee that the firm will not cheat-applies in the bilat-
eral and multilateral context as well.
A reputation is a valuable asset, and the asset's value is lost if the firm
cheats. 75 A firm wants to credibly offer a given quality level of goods for
sale. Cheating is claiming to offer high quality goods but actually selling
low quality. This can be profitable in the short run. Unless there is some
reason not to do so, sellers often cheat in this way. Buyers that are aware
of this form of cheating, however, will not believe the firm's promise to
offer high quality goods. Therefore, since some buyers would be willing to
pay for high quality if they could be sure of getting it, there is a real social
loss if the firm cannot credibly promise to offer high quality.
If a firm can invest in creating a reputation for high quality, then
there will be a return on this investment. The investment will pay as long
as the firm does not cheat. There are various unilateral mechanisms a
firm can use to create a reputation. The key is to create some firm-specific
capital that will become worthless if the firm cheats. This capital is the
investment in reputation guaranteeing that the firm will not cheat.
Advertising is one such investment form.76 Advertising the firm's
brand name, even if the advertisements convey no additional information,
indicates that the firm plans to offer high quality. If it does not, then the
investment in advertising becomes worthless because consumers will no
longer shop at the firm. There are other investments that serve a similar
73. "There is already a blacklist of people with whom we don't deal anymore
[because they have reneged on payment]." Uchitelle, supra note 13, at A10 (quoting a
Russian broker).
74. This material is based on Rubin, Private Mechanisms, in THE POLrCAiL ECONOMY
OF THE TRANSITION PROCESS IN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 4.
75. David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in PERSPECrVES ON PosI-
TIvE PoLmcAIL ECONOMY 106-08 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., 1990); RUBIN,
supra note 46.
76. Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contrac-
tual Performance 89 J. Poi- EcoN. 615, 630-31 (1981).
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function. Firms can invest in expensive signs or logos, which also become
worthless if the firm cheats. Coca-Cola, in selling its product in Russia, is
building custom-made kiosks shaped like a Coke can.77 Law firms invest
in expensive decor, which serves the same function.
Firms can also offer high quality items for sale at the price of low
quality items for a time to induce consumers to try the product. The losses
incurred are the investment. Consumers will try the product because they
have nothing to lose even if the firm cheats (since they are paying the
price for low quality). Once a firm creates a reputation in a brand name,
it can extend this reputation to additional products. Some western com-
panies selling in the post-Communist economies are selling at low prices
in order to establish such reputations.
Firms can also take advantage of trading partners' reputations. Repu-
tations can be created either at the manufacturing or the retail level. A
retailer can benefit by carrying manufacturers' products with already
established reputations. Conversely, a manufacturer can benefit by selling
his product through a retailer who has established a reputation. Actions
are bilateral if there is explicit contracting regarding reputation transfers,
as discussed in the next section, but a firm can also unilaterally benefit
from this mechanism.
While firms can privately invest in reputation creation, there appear
to be some difficulties in the Eastern countries, particularly in Russia, with
this process. Firms here have traditionally valued secrecy rather than the
openness needed for reputations to work. As Tourevski and Morgan point
out, "Iv] ery often Soviet participants take a closed or secretive position and
the attempts to hide information can reach ridiculous levels."78 Vladimir
Kvint warns that "[f] oreign investors need to be aggressive about getting
information, because by inclination and long-standing habit, companies
won't divulge it."7 9 It is not clear why firms are excessively secretive, but
such behavior can be counterproductive. One possible explanation is
that, in bargaining, firms are often concerned with guaranteeing that their
partner does not make a profit rather than maximizing joint profits. As
discussed below, this bargaining strategy may be due to short-time hori-
zons caused by uncertainty.
B. Bilateral Mechanisms
This article deals with three issues relating to bilateral arrangements: self-
enforcing contracts, vertical relationships between dealers and manufac-
turers, and the use of "hostages." Contracts, including private arbitration
clauses, are not relevant here since they fit better into the multilateral
analysis.
77. Laurie Hays, Building a Market: Amid Russian Turmoi Coca-Cola Is PlacingA Bet on
the Future, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 1993, at 1.
78. TourvmsKi & MORGAN, supra note 22, at 245.
79. VLADimmi Kvnrr, THE BAREFOOT SHOEmAER ,prrAzING ON THE NEW RussIA
79 (1993).
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1. Self-Enforcing Agreemets
The most important type of bilateral mechanism is the creation of what
has been called a "self-enforcing agreement."8 0 This is an agreement
between two firms containing no external enforcement provisions. The
agreement operates as long as it is in the interest of both firms to maintain
it. For each firm, the agreement's value is the value of the expected future
business from "maintaining the relationship." If a firm cheats, then it
gains in the short run but loses future business value.
As long as transactions are correctly structured, then external
enforcement is unnecessary. Correct structuring requires two major con-
ditions. First, the parties must have some reasonable expectation that the
agreement will last for some time. If there is a clearly specified last period,
or if parties expect the agreement to end at a particular time, then a firm
will have an incentive to cheat in that period because there is no future
business to lose. If both sides know that cheating will occur in the last
period, however, then there is an incentive to cheat in the second-to-last
period, since cheating will occur in the last period anyway. In other words,
self-enforcing contracts with specified termination dates "unravel" and are
not stable.
Second, each party must make some return on the transaction that is
somewhat greater than a competitive or normal return. The excess return
must be large enough to make the present discounted value of the future
profits, discounted both for time and for the probability that the sequence
of transactions will end, greater than the one-time gain from cheating. If
these conditions can be met, then contracts can be self-enforcing with no
requirement for external legal enforcement.
Uchitelle reveals that exactly this sort of contracting occurs in Russia:
"[T]woconcepts-mutual benefit and trust-have come to play a major
role in these early days of Russian capitalism. What these concepts come
down to is this: If both parties to an agreement are benefiting from the
deal, presumably they will not break the contract."81 Nonetheless, Tourev-
ski and Morgan argue that there seems to be a tradition in Russia of hard
bargaining: "Soviets see business deals as fixed and finite entities. Only
when ensuring that they will end up with more and the negotiating part-
ners end up with less do they feel the negotiations are successful."82 They
add that "[o]ne of the chief criteria for evaluating how foreign trade offi-
cials do their job is the discount they generate during negotiations, which
is supposed to show how persistent and uncompromising they are as busi-
nessmen."8 3 As long as this sort of bargaining occurs, it will be difficult to
establish self-enforcing agreements.
Burandt discusses the formation of a joint venture for advertising
between a Russian organization and the American advertising agency,
80. Telser, supra note 68, at 27.
81. Uchitele, supra note 13, at Al.
82. TouRm'iS & MORGAN, supra note 22, at 246.
83. Id at 243.
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Young and Rubicam. He indicates that Young and Rubicam would price
its services and pay the media "fairly" because the goal was to "establish
[itself] as a reputable and leading company in this business for the long
haul."8 4 On the other hand, "[i] t wasn't atypical in the Soviet Union for
organizations to overcharge customers and underpay suppliers."85 In
other words, Burandt is arguing for prices that would make agreements
self-enforcing, and such prices seem to be less common in Russia.
A costly way for exchange to occur is for individuals to trade only with
close associates or with relatives. This pattern of trade was common under
Communism. It is likely to persist unless and until institutions for dispute
resolution become available. Large gains may be realized, however, if the
mechanisms can be generalized to additional trading partners.
2. Vertical Controls
An interesting class of bilateral transactions are between product manufac-
turers and retailers. Manufacturers with brand name capital might want
retailers to carry out various policies such as: demonstrating and advertis-
ing the product, certification of quality, maintaining freshness, promoting
the product to marginal consumers, maintenance of complete inventories,
and refraining from "switching" customers to alternative product lines
when consumers respond to manufacturers' advertisements.
Numerous mechanisms can achieve these goals, including: establish-
ment of maximum or minimum prices for sale of goods (resale price
maintenance); territorial restrictions, including exclusive territories;
requirements that dealers carry only the manufacturer's brands (exclusive
dealing); and requiring certain retailing practices, such as shelf space
requirements. Manufacturers also may integrate directly into retailing or
may establish franchises for selling their product. It is not the purpose of
this article to discuss the business reasons for these restrictions; such dis-
cussions are available elsewhere. 86 These restrictions can be carried out as
self-enforcing agreements, with a termination threat as the only sanction.
There is no need for state enforcement of these arrangements. However,
state hostility (as, for example, through much American antitrust law) can
threaten the viability of such agreements.
Franchising might particularly be useful in the former Communist
economies. There are many excessively large and excessively centralized
enterprises. Splitting some of these entities into separate firms linked
through franchise contracts could be a useful way to decentralize without
losing the common brand name benefits.
3. Hostages
A firm can commit to not cheating by offering a hostage to its trading
partner. A simple hostage is a cash deposit that will be lost if the firm
84. BuRANDT, supra note 60, at 20.
85. I&
86. RunrN, supra note 46, ch. 6.
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cheats. Such a hostage requires some outside enforcement, but not by the
state. For example, the firms couldjointly hire an attorney, empower him
to decide if cheating had occurred and, if so, have him award the payment
to the victim. Of course, there is a problem in trusting the attorney not to
expropriate the hostage. However, firms might exist whose sole value is
their reputation capital for enforcing such agreements, and who therefore
would have no incentive to cheat as long as their reputation were worth
more than any one hostage. Law firms or investment banking firms might
be able to perform this function. International firms might be particularly
well suited for this role because of their established valuable reputations.
A more natural method is the creation of bilateral hostages. If firm A
is dependent on firm B for some input, then firm A would have an incen-
tive to make firm B dependent on firm A as well. Moreover, firm B would
have an incentive to be put in this position to keep itself from cheating.
For example, firms making cardboard boxes commonly trade components
with each other across geographic areas; in this case neither firm can hold
up the other without also putting itself at risk.
C. Multilateral Mechanisms
This is the most interesting class of adaptations, and the least studied. A
well-defined multilateral arrangement involving a group of member firms
can enforce honest dealing, both between members of the group and
between members and outsiders. The Law Merchant, the medieval body
of commercial law, was exactly this sort of multilateral private legal system
that enforced honesty by threats of reputation loss. 8 7 The Law Merchant
was subsequently adopted into the English common law. Similar institu-
tions survive today in advanced countries. The Better Business Bureau, for
example, is a reputation guaranteeing device with properties similar to
those of the Law Merchant. Many trade associations' ethics codes contain
many of the properties of the Law Merchant.88
Private contracts requiring arbitration of disputes require similar
enforcement mechanisms. Much international commercial law is based
on arbitration, with reputation loss as the major sanction for breach.89
The following section begins with an analysis of how private arbitration
demonstrates the need for multilateral enforcement.
1. Arbitration
Arbitration is feasible for most contracts. The parties to a contract can
specify in the contract that, in the event of a dispute, they will settle the
issue through arbitration. Moreover, and equally important, they can
87. HAROLD J. BERmAN, LAw AND REvOLuTION: THE FoRMATIoN OF THE WESTERN
LEGAL. TRADITION 338, 345-46 (1983); BENSON, supra note 38; Paul R. Milgrom et al., The
Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade. The Law Merchant, PrivateJudges, and the Cham-
pagne Fairs, 2 EGoN. & PoL. 1, 5 (1990).
88. For a collection of essays on ethics, business, and trade asociations, see THE
ETHIccA BAsIS OF EcoNoMIc FREEDoM (Ivan Hill ed., 1976).
89. Benson, Customary Law as Social Contrat, supra note 68, at 23.
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specify ex ante which arbitrator or forum they will use. Thus, if there are
competing "court" systems, or competing groups of arbitrators, the parties
can select the one they desire. Parties to contracts written in good faith
will not expect to breach at the time the agreement is drafted, and will not
plan on a future breach. Breach will occur only in the event of unex-
pected events, which can affect either side to the contract. Therefore, ex
ante the parties will desire to select the forum for dispute resolution that
they expect will yield the most efficient results, so that ex ante competition
among arbitrators will favor those with a reputation for providing the most
efficient (wealth maximizing) decisions.
Parties can also select the body of law they wish to govern. Arbitrators
can then enforce this law with respect to the contract. If parties com-
monly choose one body of law, this will be evidence that this law might be
the most efficient for use as public law. Where law is not specified or
relevant, arbitrators can use industry custom as a method of determining
liability. Indeed, much common law and most commercial law is based on
custom.
Note, however, that in the post-Communist societies, custom is likely
to be less useful as a basis for law than has traditionally been true. Those
who write of custom as a basis for law90 have in mind a situation in which
trade is already occurring and a lawmaker arrives, or rises to power, and
begins to use the existing customs as a basis for law. This is, for example,
the approximate way in which the commercial code incorporated the Law
Merchant. In the Communist economies, however, existing custom has
evolved largely in circumstances in which trade was illegal, and it was nec-
essary to hide or disguise the terms and even the existence of exchange.
Thus, existing customs may not be as well-suited to adoption into formal
law as has traditionally been true.
Indeed, those who were entrepreneurs under Communism may be
true criminals today.91 This depends on whether their skill was engaging
in trade and market transactions (at that time illegal), or in other illegal
activities. Moreover, the excess secrecy custom, mentioned above, would
be counterproductive in a market economy. Nonetheless, customs devel-
oped since liberation should be useful.
There is a limit to purely private arbitration, however; the party who
loses in a dispute has an incentive to ignore the decision. In countries
with an established body of contract law, the courts will often enforce the
arbitrator's decree. In a society where there is no court enforcement of
such decrees, the only recourse is a reputation remedy. In small societies
where reputation is common knowledge among all parties, simply pub-
licizing the cheating may work. In larger societies, however, where there
are many trading partners, it may be necessary to devise more complex
devices for private enforcement of arbitration decrees. This is the topic of
the next section.
90. E.g., BENSON, supra note 38.
91. Kvrmr, supra note 79, at 196-200; ToUmr & MORGAN, supra note 22, at 210-11.
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2. Multilateral Enforcement Devices
Consider a trade association with the following policies:
1. The association collects dues from all members. These dues subsi-
dize part of the arbitration proceedings' costs in resolving disputes among
members and between members and customers or suppliers. Disputants
also pay part of the costs.
2. Information is made available to all potential customers and suppli-
ers regarding the list of members so that it is possible for a potential cus-
tomer to ascertain at low cost if a potential seller is a trade association
member.
3. If the arbitrator's decision goes against a party, and the party
ignores the decision (e.g., refuses to pay damages as ordered by the arbi-
trator), then the party will be expelled from the association.
4. Therefore, when an expelled party's potential trading partner que-
ries the association, he will learn that the seller is not a member, and will
accordingly be able to avoid trading with the party, or will trade on differ-
ent terms.
This mechanism's structure corresponds to the Law Merchant mecha-
nism.92 Milgrom provides a game theory analysis of this mechanism and
shows that the outcome is stable and will lead to efficient trading
patterns. 93
Many trade associations that engage in self-policing also follow this
pattern.9 4 The Code of Ethics and Interpretations of the Pubic Relations
Society of America calls for an investigation of allegations of misconduct,
with expulsion and publicity as potential remedies.9 5 Moreover, this code
includes interpretations based on actual cases, which form a "body of
law."9 6 Similarly, the Code of Ethics of the National Association of Real-
tors has a provision for expulsion of members who do not accept the find-
ings of review boards.97
Diamond "bourses" (diamond exchange markets) such as the New
York Diamond Dealers Club, and the World Federation of Diamond
Bourses, follow this same pattern.9 8 These associations generally provide
arbitration proceedings, and the ultimate sanction for violation of an arbi-
trated agreement is expulsion, although sometimes formal law will be used
as well. Information about violators is also made public. Better Business
Bureaus (B.B.B.s), private reputation enforcing groups in the United
States, also follow this procedure, although these organizations also pro-
vide information about non-member firms. A simple mechanism would
92. Milgrom et al., supra note 87, at 5-6. It is similar to the mechanism used by the
Maghribi traders. See Greif, supra note 50.
93. Id.
94. THE EmI-kL BASiS OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM, supra note 88, at 257-308.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 285.
97. Id.
98. Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System. Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. L C.L STUD. 115, 124-30 (1992).
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be for member firms to display, on their doors or in their advertising, a
logo indicating that the B.B.B. approves them.
Trade associations and B.B.B.s illustrate the usefulness of reputation
guaranteeing associations. Trade associations commonly include mem-
bers of a given business, irrespective of geographic location. Conversely,
B.B.B.s include businesses in a particular area, irrespective of the nature of
the business. The latter type of organization is more likely to be useful to
guarantee reputations of those who sell to consumers; the former is likely
to be more useful to guarantee reputations of business transactors.
D. Limits to Private Mechanisms
While private mechanisms can support some exchange, there are limits to
their power. In general, a party will behave opportunistically whenever it
pays to do so. Explicit enforceable agreements can mean that opportu-
nism will be prohibitively expensive. A court order or an enforceable arbi-
tration decree can remove any profit from opportunistic behavior. Other
mechanisms are less reliable.
Consider reputation or hostages as enforcement devices. If a trading
partner cheats, the most that can be lost is the value of the reputation.
This means that it will usually not pay for one party to trust the other party
with any sum worth more than the second party's reputation. This pro-
vides an upper limit to the investment amount. Similarly, as returns occur
further in the future, the present value is also smaller. This limits the
length of time for which transactions can be committed. Such problems
may be more acute in new economies since relatively more enterprises are
new and therefore have relatively low-valued reputations.
Similarly, the amount that can be put at risk in a self- enforcing agree-
ment is the value of the stream of quasi-rents (excess returns) generated
by the stream of transactions. If more than this is put at risk, it will pay for
one party to cheat and expropriate the excess investment. Again, to the
extent that there is greater uncertainty in new economies about future
events than in more mature economies, the expected future values are less
reliable, and self-enforcement mechanisms will therefore support less
exchange than would otherwise be the case.
This does not mean that such mechanisms are valueless. On the con-
trary, they are common, even in developed economies. It is important,
however, to realize their limits. Formal enforcement devices should sup-
port such mechanisms whenever possible.
IV. The Current Situation
It is incorrect to view all post-Communist countries as starting from the
same point. Of those countries specifically considered in this report, the
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland are more similar to each other than
any is to Russia. It is likely that the Baltic Republics (Latvia, Estonia, Lithu-
ania) are similar to the first three countries, while the Ukraine and
Belorussia may be similar to Russia. Some of the Asiatic republics (Uzbeki-
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stan, Turkmenistan, Kirghizstan, Tadjikistan) may be relatively less devel-
oped than Russia.99 The exact ranking is not important; what is relevant is
that the countries considered may provide examples for others.
A. The Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary
The civil codes of the countries in the former Soviet Union are based on
pre-Soviet European Civil Codes and "many of the principles are not
inconsistent with a market economy."100 In many cases, these codes have
been adopted from pre-Communist codes. This is true of the Czech
Republic, Poland, and Hungary. These three countries have a set of basic
contract laws in place.
Poland adopted a code in 1964 that was in turn based on a 1933 code,
but with various Socialist additions; these additions were removed in
1990.101 Thus, current Polish contract law is a 1933 Western law. A com-
mission is currently redrafting this code to update it. In Hungary, those
parts of the Civil Code originally written to govern small, non-commercial
private transactions now govern all transactions. 102 The Hungarian legal
system appears to be the most well-adapted for market transactions of the
three countries considered.10 3 The Czech and Slovak Federal Republics
(C.S.F.R.) had a system more adapted to Communism,so it had less law on
which to build than other countries. The C.S.F.R. adopted a new civil
code and a new commercial code in 1991.
Thus, in many of the Eastern countries there now exist indigenous
bodies of contract law. These are deficient in that they are either crafted
de novo (Czech Republic) or adapted from earlier law (Poland, Hungary.)
Thus, none are fully adapted to contemporary business. For example,
Polish limited liability firms were small family-type businesses, and there
was little formal law dealing with larger business. 10 4 Nonetheless, begin-
ning with the existing body of contract law and allowing modifications, as
discussed below, is likely to be the most efficient and most expeditious way
to achieve a body of contract law suited to market conditions in the post-
Communist economies. Alexei Klishin discusses such an evolutionary pro-
cess, although state control was more powerful when he wrote than
99. This rough ordering is consistent with a table in Touasvsai & MORGAN, supra
note 22, at 115. This table, based on analysis from MoskovskieNovosti, does not explicitly
rate legal systems, but does rate "Development of Infrastructure" only of former Soviet
Republics. Id. Vladimir Kvint provides a similar ranking. Kvmrr, supra note 79, at 207-
08. Ernst & Young has rated additional countries. In this rating, Poland, the Czech
Republic, and Hungary are rated first in "Business Infrastructure"; the Former USSR is
rated significantly lower. Ryam Tutak, Once Preeminentfor Fordgn Investment, Hungay Is
Now Slipping in Status, BUDAPEST SUN, May 13-19, 1993, at 6.
100. IMF, supra note 6, at 247.
101. PoLAND, supra note 6, at 19.
102. HUNGARY, supra note 6, at 34.
103. Paul Marer, Economic Transformation in Central and Eastern Europe in MAMNG
MARKETS: ECONOMIC TRANsFORMIuroN IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE PosT-SovIEr
STATES, supra note 4, at 59.
104. POLAND, supra note 6, at 9.
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now.
10 5
Commerce can function with a relatively small body of contract law.
Most contract terms are written privately by the parties themselves. As
Benson points out, parties actually make "law" by writing a contract.1 06
Explicit public law serves two functions in addition to enforcing private
terms. First, it fills gaps; it covers situations that the parties did not antici-
pate. Second, it supplies defaults; if the law provides certain terms or indi-
cates certain results, the parties to a private agreement can save resources
by not dealing with these issues directly, or by paying lawyers to deal with
them. The major part of the contract, however, is the result of private
agreement. Thus, parties can engage in substantial amounts of contractu-
ally based commerce with little explicit "law" on the books.
Gray provides a summary of the situation in Poland that seems to
apply more generally-
Although the legal structure is generally satisfactory in most areas,
practice is still uncertain in all areas. The generality of the laws leaves wide
discretion for administrators and courts, and there has not yet been time to
build up a body of cases and practice to further define the rules of the
game. Although the courts are in general honest and are used by the popu-
lation, they have little experience in economic matters. Judges are not well
paid, and the best lawyers have a strong incentive to go into private practice.
The wide discretion and general lack of precedent and competence create
tremendous legal uncertainty that is sure to hamper private sector
development.' 0 7
B. Russia10 8
The Russian body of law seems less well-adapted than the first three coun-
tries. This may be because Russia was Communist longer than the others;
existing pre-Communist law is thus older than in the other countries,.and
there is an additional generation since people have had actual exposure to
markets. Russia was also less economically advanced at the time of the
Revolution than other countries; its body of capitalist law is consequently
less well- developed.
The major legal weaknesses do not seem to be in the contract law
area. A large body of Russian contract law used under the Soviet system to
govern transactions between enterprises. This law differs from contract
law in market economies. It is not as different as we might expect, how-
ever. "More surprising, perhaps, is the substantial convergence of contrac-
tual norms in Soviet and Anglo-American legal systems despite significant
105. Alexei Klishin, Economic Reform and Cmtract Law in the USSR, 28 COLUM.J. TRANs-
NAT'L L. 253, 255-56 (1990).
106. BENsoN, supra note 38.
107. PoL.N'zD, supra note 6, at 2.
108. Much of this section is based on IMF, supra note 6, ch. IV.7. Other important
sources are Kvmr, supra note 80 and TouiRmmvi & MoRGAN, supra note 22. Andrei
Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny provide a general theory of corruption. Their discussion
of the case of Russia is consistent with the observations discussed in this section. Andrei
Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Corruption, 108 QJ. EcoN. 599 (1993).
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differences in the organization of capitalist and socialist economies."10 9
Attorneys and businessmen in Russia indicate that difficulties in doing
business are due more to uncertainty about government actions than con-
tractual weaknesses.
Pervasive difficulties in the Russian legal system weaken the function-
ing of contract law. These difficulties apparently stem from the December
1990 law "On Property in the R.S.F.S.R. " 110 This law was seriously incom-
plete, and the needed subordinate legislation was not passed because of
political difficulties. Moreover, "[t]here was no clear distribution of state
property between the Federation and its member republics, districts, and
regions.""1 These problems in property rights allocation and conflict
between governmental units still plague the country today. Moreover, in
Russia, more than in the other countries, people with some hostility
towards the adoption of a market system remain in authority.
The so-called "war of laws" is another force leading to legal uncer-
tainty in Russia. Various levels of government may pass conflicting laws,
and there is no mechanism for resolving such conflicts. This makes busi-
ness planning difficult:" 2
At the time of this writing, the problem of lack of clarity and uniformity
exists at all levels of government and involves uncertainty concerning the
location of authority to legislate and implement the laws, the nature and
extent of the legislative and executive powers, and the appropriate means
and methods for enforcement. 113
While the splitting of the Soviet Union into independent countries may
have reduced these problems, it has not solved them all, and local laws are
continually changing.114 There are inconsistencies in rules and interpre-
tations of various Russian ministries and departments.115 The multiplicity
of fora for commercial dispute resolution is more severe in economies
lacking "a well-developed body of commercial law." 16 There are over 800
ministries, and many of these can stop any given deal.117
Only eight percent of potential joint ventures begin operating." 8
Kvint estimates that ten percent ofjoint venture failures are due to legal
problems." 9 Kvint also estimates that twenty-eight percent of the failures
109. Kroll, supra note 16, at 147.
110. Topo-RmN, supra note 35.
111. Id. at17.
112. PeterJ. Pettibone, Working Group 3: The EmergingLegal Environmen in INvaio
IN REFoRM: DoING BusiNEss IN A CHANGING Sovmr UNION, supra note 4, at 252.
113. IMF, supra note 6, at 226.
114. Ia. Kuz'minov, Soviet Economk Culture: The Legacy and the Paths of Modernization,
35 PaoBs. EcoN. TRANSmON 5, 18-19 (1993).
115. V. Chernogorodskii & A. Tsyganov, Economic and Organizational Conditions for the
Support of Entrepreneurship in Russia 35 PRoas. ECON. TRANSMON 71, 72 (1992).
116. IMF, supra note 6, at 254.
117. Kvnr, supra note 79, at 26.
118. Id at 181. Tourevski and Morgan indicate 20-30% of licensed joint ventures
"have been actually operating enterprises." TouRvsiu & MORGAN, supra note 22, at 65.
119. KvInrr, supra note 79, at 186.
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are due to the inability to find an appropriate partner,120 and twenty per-
cent to "financing."12 1 Legal problems may exacerbate these difficulties.
For example, difficulty in finding financing may be caused by poor prop-
erty rights definitions, or by difficulty in foreclosing, making it difficult to
use property as collateral. Contractual uncertainty may make finding a
partner more difficult. Thus, the legal system may be responsible for a
greater percentage of failures than is immediately apparent. Sixteen per-
cent of the failures are due to "bureaucratic problems,"122 which may also
relate to legal uncertainty.
Tourevski and Morgan identify several areas in which respondents to
interviews (Russian and foreign businessmen) have indicated weaknesses
in the law.123 Indeed, these weaknesses are a major theme of their book.
For one set of examples, they cite:
1. Vague, contradictory, inconsistent formulations.
2. Dependence of the laws on ideological trends and tendencies.
3. Isolated lawmaking, divorced from international legislation.
4. The conflict between laws which had been centralized and the republics,
between the republics themselves, or between the republics and their
autonomous territories. According to the prognosis expressed in the inter-
view, this tendency will be increasing.
5. The instability of laws which are unclear and change from day to day.124
New laws are passed with no thought to their consistency with existing
law.125 Moreover, there are no legal provisions for ending joint ventures
and allocating their property; some potential transactors are consequently
reluctant to form such ventures.126 One strategy for dealing with such
legal inconsistency is to enter the market on a small scale and observe
what happens. 12 7 Many foreign firms, for example, have small invest-
ments in Russia, often involving only the retailing of products. To the
extent that quicker or larger investments would occur if certainty
increased, then uncertainty imposes real costs on the Russian economy.
Numerous examples of such inconsistencies exist. In one randomly
selected week, the Moscow Times, a daily English language newspaper,
reported the following examples of market interference and contractual
uncertainty:
From April 9 to May 25, oil prices were controlled at levels well below
market prices as a result of a politically-motivated decree imposed before
the election. 12 8 As a result of the decree maintaining prices at the March
1 level, Moscow suffered severe gasoline shortages. Some refineries
refused to sell in Moscow; two refineries closed down. Even though the
120. Id at 182.
121. Id. at 221.122. Id at 221.
123. Touarv si& MORGAN, supra note 22, at 166-92.
124. Id at 166-67.
125. Id. at 168.
126. Id. at 73.
127. Id. at 39-40.
128. Gasoline Pdees Free to Rise Moscow TIMEs, May 25, 1993, at 2.
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price was allowed to rise to 70 rubles per liter, mobile tanks were selling
the same grade for 120 to 150 rubles per liter.
1 2 9
A Korean-Russian joint venture has invested $70 million in a timber
project in eastern Russia since 1990. An environmental dispute went to
the Russian Supreme Court, which "failed to come to any concrete conclu-
sion, sending the case back to the regional court."1 30 There has also been
a "worsening tax situation."' 3 1 While original estimates were that the ven-
ture would earn a profit by the fourth year, "under current conditions it
could take seven to 10 years."' 3 2 Other potential investors are closely
monitoring this situation.
De Beers had signed a five-year contract with the Russian diamond
marketing agency. Now, the "Precious Metals and Stones Committee" is
attempting to renegotiate this contract. 13 3
The Moscow city government changed the method of taxing land
owned by joint ventures. The joint ventures were previously taxed at the
same rate as Russians, about $3500 per hectare. Now, the rate will range
up to $465,000 per hectare, the same rate paid by foreigners. The exact
rate will depend on the degree of foreign ownership of the joint venture.
The Moscow Times reported that:
The new decree is the latest in a series of changes in tax and land-ownership
laws that have made it difficult for foreign and Russian firms to lease prop-
erty for office space and development in the capital. In recent months, for
example, the City Council has annulled leases signed by the mayor's office
and passed legislation calling for lease agreements to be renegotiated.' 3 4
These new tax rates mean that some past investments may not be profita-
ble, and would therefore not have been undertaken.' 3 5
Other examples of new laws that are inconsistent with existing law
include:
The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations is creating an auditing
board that will have the right to control or even shut down any independ-
ent entity engaged in foreign economic relations. This board will be able
to question the business decision of the entities subject to its control.' 3 6
Russian customs officials, and later the KGB, seized automobile bat-
teries produced by an American-Russian joint venture because of a techni-
cality in the joint venture charter.13 7
Customs officials refused permission for a Leningrad company to
export scrap metal, even though the company had permission from the
129. Mikhail Dubik, Moscow Hikes Price of Gasoline, Moscow TIMEs, May 29, 1993, at
11.
130. Hugh Fraser, Hyundai Log Project Daunted by Troubles, Moscow TIMwEs, May 28,
1993, at 12.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. State Seeks to AlterDe Beers Contrac Moscow TmEs, May 29, 1993, at 11.
134. Geoff Winestock, Land Tax HitsJVFrojects, Moscow TIMfs, May 27, 1993, at 1.
135. Id.
136. TouRxvsgi & MORGAN, supra note 22, at 42.
137. Id. at 4445.
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Russian Federation.1 38
A cooperative began to recover and process timber that sunk during
the downstream floating process and which was otherwise wasted. Within
six months, the government shut down the operation, leaving the timber
to rot.1 3 9
A Russian magazine publisher contracted to trade waste paper for
computers, but it was denied a license to export waste. Even if one minis-
try had granted such a license, approval of another would also have been
required. 140
Western oil companies might spend up to $70 billion annually to
develop Russian oil fields were it not for fears of opportunism. 141 Much of
this opportunism comes from the government, which seems to change
rules or increase export taxes to appropriate past investments opportunis-
tically. There is, however, private opportunism as well. For example, after
one company had invested in machinery for drilling for Russian oil, the
firm that controlled the pipeline providing the only route to the sea
doubled its rates. 142
The Raddison Corporation negotiated an agreement with the Krem-
lin to build a hotel in Moscow. Once the property was completed, how-
ever, the Moscow city council demanded a partnership before allowing the
hotel to open. Negotiations delayed the opening for about one year, with
the city finally getting its partnership. 143
Even where investment occurs, investors are aware that contracts are
subject to great political uncertainty. Elf Aquitane, the French company,
has signed a contract to explore for oil in Russia and Kazahkstan.144
Other American oil companies have also signed contracts, but Elf's
endeavor is the only one not part of a joint venture.
Elf has the first of what is called a production agreement with Russia...but
whether the contract will remain in effect as written remains uncertain.
It took Elf about a year to get the deal approved by the Russian Parliament,
but whether this gives the contract any legal force is still murky, given the
struggle between President Boris Yeltsin and some leaders of the
Parliament.
A High official in the Tyumen Region, Russia's largest oil area, said there
was a continuing tug of war between local officials and the ministers in Mos-
cow over control of new ventures.
138. Id. at 170.
139. Id. at 209.
140. Kvirr, supra note 79, at 194.
141. Ann Imse, American Know-How and Russian 0i4 N.Y..Trsms MAG., Mar. 7, 1993, at
30.
142. Id- at 57.
143. BnuL THOMAS & CHARLE SuHRLAN, RED TAPE: ADvENTuRE CAPrrAU5M IN THE
NEW RUssiA 145-46 (1992).
144. Agis Salpukas, In an Oil Rush to the Eas Elf Plays Pied Piper, N.Y. TiuMs, June 27,
1993, at F7.
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In such an atmosphere, Elf's straightforward contract could be bent out of
shape.14
5
Ikea, the Swedish furniture company, planned to invest in producing
as well as selling goods in Russia.' 46 In 1988, Ikea agreed to renovate a
dozen Russian furniture factories to produce furniture that it planned to
sell in stores scheduled to open by 1991. The plan failed, however, when
the U.S.S.R. collapsed. Ikea is currently involved in litigation and in arbi-
tration in Stockholm. Ikea's chief executive, Anders Moberg, said that,
"[tlerrible problems untangling various obligations between the old
U.S.S.R and the new republics have us much more cautious." 147 Ikea now
plans to invest in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak republics,
but not Russia. 148
These examples indicate difficulties with the Russian political system,
rather than with the legal system itself. Political reform is needed to cor-
rect these problems.149 The remedies proposed in this paper are only
available in ec6nomies where decision makers have the power and will to
impose reforms; they will not work where such will is lacking.
Political stability will support legal reform in another way. Part of the
difficulty with law enforcement is undoubtedly due to uncertainty. Many
mechanisms discussed here depend on reputations and on other long-
term investments (e.g., in self-enforcing agreements). If parties believe
that property or legal institutions are likely to change in the near future,
they will be less willing to invest in such agreements. This may explain the
widely noted tendency of Russian negotiators to drive excessively difficult
bargains, as discussed above. Such bargaining may mean that Russian par-
ticipants receive less long-term returns from the agreement, but if parties
have shorter time horizons, this consideration will be less significant.
Short time horizons may also explain some otherwise puzzling behav-
ior of political authorities. If a political authority radically changes the tax
rate faced by businesses, that authority may profit in the short run because
the jurisdiction can appropriate the quasi-rents from the completed invest-
ment. This policy has long-term costs, however, because other businesses
will be less willing to invest in this jurisdiction. But a short time horizon
means that the appropriated investment's present value can outweigh the
long-term losses from lost future investments.
145. Elf is 50.79% owned by the French government. Thus, officials in charge of
investing might put weight on political factors rather than expected profits in deciding
where to invest. Normally, major stockholders would be expected to monitor such
activity, but Elf's "management has been making- its own decisions for many years-
including its journey to the East-with little supervision by the state." This may also be
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owned companies, such as Renault and Air France. See Salpukas, supra note 144, at F7.
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The famous Coase Theorem shows that with well-defined property
rights and sufficiently low transaction costs, the final use of resources is
efficient and invariant with respect to initial rights assignments. 150 Most
criticisms of the theorem have focused on the second condition, the mag-
nitude of transaction costs.15t The theorem may not hold in the present
Russian situation, however, because the first condition, the existence of
well-defined property rights, is not satisfied. The problem is not anarchy;
it is rather the existence of too many governments, with insufficiently
defined lines of power between them. Property rights are not well-defined
because it is unclear who has the power to define them. The result is an
inefficient use of resources. This problem must be solved for any degree
of economic progress to be feasible.
The situation in Russia is perhaps typical of what, as Joseph Tainter
indicates, commonly occurs after the collapse of a complex society:
With disintegration, central direction is no longer possible. The former
political center undergoes a significant loss of prominence and power. It is
often ransacked and may ultimately be abandoned. Small, petty states
emerge in the formerly unified territory, of which the former capital may be
one. Quite often these contend for domination, so that a period of perpet-
ual conflict ensues. The umbrella of law and protection erected over the
populace is eliminated. Lawlessness may prevail for a time.., but order will
ultimately be restored.15 2
Although the Soviet Union's collapse fulfills many of Tainter's condi-
tions, it is hoped that Russia can avoid these grim ramifications.
C. Some Possible Beginnings
Agents already exist in the post-Communist economies who could possibly
perform the functions sketched out above. It appears that some are
already doing so.
Cooperatives in Russia have formed two types of associations for lob-
bying purposes.' 5 3 Some are geographically organized and include busi-
nesses in a particular area. Others are essentially trade associations and
include cooperatives in the same business sector. Cooperative associations
provide services to members, including legal assistance, and pursue a polit-
ical program. Two such major organizations are the U.S.S.R. Union of
Amalgamated Cooperatives (founded in 1989) and the Union of Lease-
150. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
151. E.g., Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11J. LEGAL STuD. 1, 27 (1982).
152. JOsEPH A. TAmuTER, THE COLLAPSE OF CoMPLEX SoCIEES 19-20 (1988). This is a
fascinating study of collapse, and many of the conditions discussed are observed in the
former Soviet Union in areas not relevant to the concerns of this paper. One weakness
of the book is its prediction that "collapse today is neither an option nor an immediate
threat." I&. at 213. Moreover, although writing in 1988, Tainter considered and
rejected only the possibility of collapse of Western Civilization. The collapse of the
Soviet Union was not contemplated.
153. ANTHoNYJoNs & Whaium MosKorr, Ko-ops: THE REBmTH OF ENTRazRNEum-
SHin IN THM SOVIET UNION 110-18 (1991).
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holders and Entrepreneurs (founded in 1990).154 Representatives of the
cooperative movement were involved in legislative decision making.
Again, these structures correspond to the potential multilateral organiza-
tions discussed above, but there is no evidence that these organizations
presently perform such functions.
A class of agencies performing exactly the functions identified above
is the "commodity exchange." These exchanges are trading centers with
many firms as members. Stefan Zhurek indicates that the International
Food Exchange offers a variety of services, including "arbitration for the
rapid settlement of trade disputes."155 He also indicates, however, that
volume on this exchange is low. On the other hand, the Moscow Com-
modities Exchange did over $550 million in business in May of 1991.156
The Soviet Chamber of Commerce has begun performing an infor-
mational function.15 7 This organization publishes a directory of foreign
trade participants, including information about financial positions and
business reputations. Other organizations perform similar functions. 158
Some private organizations also provide such business information. The
accounting firm of Ernst & Young has established a joint venture provid-
ing information about various aspects of doing business in Russia, includ-
ing information about "reliability of the partners."159 Several other
private ventures also provide such information. 160 In general, however,
Tourevski and Morgan believe that there is a dearth of useful business
information. 161 This gap has been exacerbated because, for a time, coop-
eratives (Soviet private firms) were forbidden from performing "middle-
man" functions.162
V. Government Policy
Thus far, the discussion has focused on private actions to create mecha-
nisms for private enforcement. But government can also facilitate these
mechanisms in various ways. Such facilitation can have two beneficial
effects. First, by increasing the agent's ability to enter into agreements,
the amount of beneficial transactions can increase. Second, by choosing
proper policies, government can facilitate the creation of a body of prece-
dent that can ultimately form the beginnings of an efficient body of laws.
This article envisions the following rough institutional structure.
There is a court system in existence. This system has some rough notion
of contract law. It may, for example, believe in "freedom of contract" and
154. ANTHONyJoNEs, IssuEs IN STATE AND PRIVATE SECrOR RELATIONS IN THE SOVIET
ECONOMY 69-88 (Dallago et al. eds., 1992). See supra note 4.
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in allowing voluntary private exchanges. A complete body of contract law
is not in place, however, so decisions of the court system in resolving
actual disputes will be somewhat uncertain. "It is entirely permissible to
adopt a kind of skeleton law in the situation where the law on a given
subject is being drafted and only the most general provisions are certain,
on the basis that the answers to the more concrete questions can only
emerge from practice."16 3
In addition, there are probably delays in reaching the court system.
In a world of high inflation, these delays may be particularly costly if court
awards are in nominal currency units, which may be happening in Rus-
sia.16 4 Unindexed contracts and court unwillingness to alter contractual
terms were responsible for a nonpayment epidemic in interwar
Germany.165
In this section, this article deals with two types of policies. Some poli-
cies will facilitate formation of private agreements. It is also possible, how-
ever, for incorrect government policies to penalize efficient conduct Past
experience in the United States shows that misuse of antitrust policies is
particularly likely to be costly; antitrust law has often erred and punished
procompetitive conduct. In post-Communist economies, where an exces-
sive fear of "monopoly capitalism" may exist, such misuse may be particu-
larly likely. Moreover, the current Russian antitrust statute contains
provisions that could lead to inefficient rulings. 166 Antitrust laws in other
countries also contain provisions that could lead to inefficiency.
16 7
This article analyzes policy in the same tripartite framework used for
analyzing private enforcement mechanisms.
A. Unilateral Mechanisms
The most important assistance governments can give to private firms to
create reputation capital is a willingness to enforce trademark property
rights. Trademarks allow buyers to determine the quality of purchased
goods, therefore enabling sellers to invest in provisions of high quality.'
68
The Russian antitrust law prohibits unauthorized use of trademarks.
16 9
Russian trademark law also allows civil damages and fines, but these penal-
ties are currently too small to provide an effective deterrent. This law
presently contains no injunctive provisions.' 7 0 At least one action, against
163. Topo umN, supra note 35, at 26.
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169. RSFSR, supra note 166, at 1.
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counterfeit Levis, has been brought.171 In another case, however, a viola-
tion of an exclusivity agreement to export Stolichnaya vodka to Greece
resulted in only a 300 ruble fine to the violator.1
72
Czechoslovakia passed a trademark law in 1988, but trademark regis-
tration is slow, and the law is untested.17 Poland has a body of trademark
law, but its enforcement may be weak. 174 Nevertheless, Wrangler jeans
successfully sued a manufacturer of labels used in counterfeit products.
The situation in Hungary is similar, 175 although Hungarian authorities
have recently destroyed 15,000 pirated cassettes to indicate that they plan
stricter enforcement of copyright laws. 176
If counterfeiting and trademark infringement are not sufficiently
penalized, firms will have reduced incentives to invest in the creation of
brand name capital. Given that law enforcement authorities apparently
lack adequate resources to enforce laws against counterfeiting optimally, a
second best solution must be considered. This alternative would allow
firms whose products are the subject of counterfeiting to enforce trade-
mark rights privately. Such firms would have the right to seize counterfeit
goods and sell them on the market, presumably after removing the coun-
terfeit trademark. This policy will generally not lead to optimal enforce-
ment against counterfeiting, but it is preferable to minimal or no public
enforcement.' 77 Some western movie companies (including MGM,
Warner, Sony and Paramount) "have been training and financing full-
time, private anti-piracy investigators" to enforce their rights in Hun-
gary.178 Such private enforcement, however, must be subject to ultimate
control by the state, perhaps by allowing an appeal from the targeted
counterfeiters.
Beyond this, governments can facilitate other investments in valuable
brand name creation. Advertising is one such prominent investment
method. Government owned radio and TV channels (if they cannot feasi-
bly be privatized) should allow advertising. In Russia, as of now, "the three
television stations are government owned and run very limited advertis-
ing."179 The Moscow city government passed a law requiring that, as of
April 1, 1993, foreign language signs carry the same words in Russian
(Cyrillic) script, and that the Russian words must be twice as large as the
others;' 80 St. Petersburg passed a similar law in December 1992.181 Such a
law is harmful for several reasons. First, it increases advertising costs by
171. Fake Levis in Moscow, Moscow Bus. WEEK, Dec. 3, 1992, at 14 (on file with
author).
172. TouRvsi & MoRGAN, supra note 22, at 186.
173. CZECH MD SLOVAK REPuBuC, supra note 6, at 9-10.
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175. 1d. at 19.
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requiring reconstruction of many signs. Second, it reduces the value of
brand names. Companies advertise in whatever way is most informative to
consumers; mandated changes in advertising will thus provide less infor-
mation. Finally, the government reduces incentives for future investments
in brand names by indicating to advertisers their willingness arbitrarily
and capriciously to destroy part of the value of past advertising.
In enforcing laws against deception, authorities should be careful not
to over-regulate and deter provision of valuable information.' 8 2 The anti-
trust law in Russia contains provisions regarding deception. These provi-
sions are sufficiently open ended so excess regulation is possible. A
certain provision prohibits "misleading consumers concerning the charac-
ter, mode and place of manufacture, consumer properties, and quality of
products."' 83
The major danger of over-regulating advertising, on the basis of the
U.S. experience, is the suppression of true information that regulatory
authorities judge to be deceptive. One example is price advertising. A
common form of advertising is the claim: "Regularly $10, now $5." Regu-
latory authorities often find such advertising deceptive if not "enough"
sales have taken place at the $10 price. Yet this type of regulation has the
effect of reducing price competition and increasing consumer prices.
Regulators also occasionally limit claims if advertisers pay insufficient
attention to a product's negative characteristics. This is often called
"deception by omission." In a market equilibrium, however, there are
strong incentives to advertise a product's negative characteristics by claim-
ing that the advertiser's product is less bad than others. The market will
thus disclose such information. Mandating disclosure is counterproduc-
tive and can actually reduce information available to consumers.
It is particularly important to note that advertising will most likely
appear deceptive in a market out of equilibrium. Advertising in this con-
text can be a powerful force for moving these markets closer to equilib-
rium. In the post-Communist economies, all markets are likely out of
equilibrium, and will probably remain so for some time. Moreover, con-
sumers probably have relatively little experience or sophistication in deal-
ing with advertising. Thus, in the short run, much advertising might
appear deceptive. However, excess regulation will reduce the market con-
vergence rate towards equilibrium, and increase the time it takes for con-
sumers to learn to deal effectively with advertising. Over-regulation is thus
particularly likely and particularly costly in these economies.
Indeed, although evidence to make a firm determination is lacking,
some evidence of such over-regulation exists. Major firms, such as Saattchi
& Saattchi and Unilever, have been fined in Hungary for offenses that do
not appear to be serious. There are also efforts to increase advertising
182. Paul H. Rubin, Economics and the Regulation of Deetion, 10 CATO J. 667, 687
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regulation in Poland and in the Czech Republic.184
Governments should keep in mind that an important incentive for
providing quality is the higher price a firm can command for higher qual-
ity. At times, and particularly until markets have adjusted, those firms pro-
viding high quality will earn high profits. These profits will signal other
potential market entrants that provision of quality products is worthwhile.
Authorities must be very careful, however, not to reduce these incentives
by regulating such aspects as the prices charged (perhaps in the name of
antitrust laws). For example, a Polish antimonopoly law prohibits charg-
ing "exorbitant prices" and the Antimonopoly Office can roll back
prices.' 8 5 Polish and Hungarian laws have the most explicit price control
provisions, and the Russian, Czech, and Slovak laws similarly contain lan-
guage that may be interpreted to allow price controls.' 8 6 Prices will natu-
rally fall as entry occurs, but entrepreneurs who first learn techniques
valuable in a market economy must be rewarded.
B. Bilateral Mechanisms
Government can do relatively little to facilitate bilateral agreements. Self-
enforcing agreements, for example, do not need government assistance.
The improper use of antitrust policy, however, could hinder creation of
bilateral arrangements. This fear is not based on pure speculation.
Improper antitrust policies in the United States have greatly hindered the
creation of valuable vertical relationships between manufacturers and
retailers. Recall some of the mechanisms that manufacturers might find
useful: establishment of maximum or minimum resale prices; territorial
restrictions on where retailers might sell, including exclusive territories;
requirements that dealers carry only the brand of the manufacturer
(exclusive dealing); and requirements of certain methods of retailing,
such as shelf space requirements. Manufacturers may also vertically inte-
grate directly into retailing, and some may establish franchises. All of
these methods should be legal.' 87 Any contract between a manufacturer
and a retailer should be strictly enforced by whatever enforcement mecha-
nism is specified. Excessive regulation of these vertical relationships or
limits on freedom of contract can reduce incentives to produce quality
goods, subsequently harming consumers.
The antitrust law in Russia may err in not allowing sufficient vertical
restrictions. There are restrictions on "writing discriminatory clauses into
a contract that put the other party at a disadvantage as compared with
other business persons"' 88 and on "impeding other business persons in
184. E.S. Browning, Eastern Europe Poses ObstaoclesforAds, WAn. ST.J.,July 30, 1992, at
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entering market[s] (withdrawingfrom market[s])."189 This easily could be
interpreted as forbidding certain vertical practices, such as exclusive deal-
ing. Decision-makers are unskilled at distinguishing between vertical and
horizontal restraints, and are therefore likely to regulate vertical restric-
tions excessively.19 0
Other antimonopoly laws have similar provisions. Czech law does not
distinguish between horizontal and vertical restrictions. 19 1 Polish law
sometimes bans tied sales, resale price maintenance, and other vertical
relationships. 192 Hungary also has similar provisions. 193 Hungarian and
Russian laws are, in general, relatively less hostile to vertical restrictions
than the Polish and Czech Republic laws, although both Polish and Hun-
garian laws ban tying arrangements independent of market share.'9 4
More generally, many of these laws apply only to firms with "domi-
nant" positions, commonly defined as market shares of thirty percent or
more. Market shares are difficult to measure, however, without sophisti-
cated methods of defining markets. In enforcing U.S. antitrust laws, mar-
ket definition is often the most difficult and contested part of an
enforcement action. Excessive enforcement is possible if decision makers
define markets too narrowly, and U.S. antitrust authorities have tradition-
ally done just this. The Hungarian and C.F.R. laws make it easier for a
firm to be defined as a "dominant" firm than in Poland and Russia,
although any of the laws could be interpreted as excessively enforcing
rules penalizing dominance.195
As mentioned above, one method of establishing credible commit-
ments for bilateral relationships is the use of hostages. This requires recip-
rocal dealing between firms. Antitrust laws have sometimes penalized this
behavior. The Russian antitrust law forbids "imposing on the other party
contractual terms which are disadvantageous to him or which are irrele-
vant to the subject-matter of the contracL" 19 6 Other countries also forbid
such practices. This can be interpreted as forbidding reciprocal transac-
tions and the use of hostages. Again, there should be no such restriction;
all reciprocal transactions between firms should be legal.
It does not appear that the antitrust laws are currently being abused.
Many businessmen and attorneys indicate the potential for abuse, but a
record of such behavior is lacking. The Czech antitrust agency is located
outside of Prague, perhaps to minimize the danger of such behavior. Sim-
ilarly, the Polish antitrust agency is in Krakow, not Warsaw.
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C. Multilateral Arrangements
Governments have the greatest ability to be helpful in facilitating multilat-
eral enforcement mechanisms. Assistance can enable parties to benefit
from such enforcement methods. Moreover, if properly done, govern-
ments can use the results of multilateral processes to generate efficient
law.
Arbitration is a natural method of dispute resolution. All courts need
do is credibly promise to recognize contractually specified arbitration
decisions as if they were court decisions. This will provide incentives for
parties to include such clauses in their agreements. There will be three
benefits to parties from such clauses.
First, an arbitration decision is likely to be available with less delay
than a court decision. Second, the parties can choose arbitrators. In a
world where judges may lack experience with business disputes and where
legal precedents may be weak, it should be possible to choose arbitrators
who will be more likely to reach efficient decisions. Future business pro-
vides an incentive to reach correct decisions because arbitrators will be
paid only if hired. Moreover, parties can specify the amount to be paid to
arbitrators. This means that arbitrators in more important (costly) dis-
putes can be paid more, so parties will have access to the quality of arbitra-
tor appropriate to the value of the case.
Third, parties can choose the body of law or rules to govern a dispute.
If the law in place is inefficient or vague, the parties can choose to have
their dispute governed by a different body of law, or by the rules of the
arbitration association. This allows more choice of law flexibility and
increases the probability that an efficient law will govern.
Thus, a decision by the courts or a statutory announcement that the
courts will honor and enforce arbitration agreements may be the single
most powerful method available for achieving efficient short run decisions
and also for generating efficient long run precedents. For reasons dis-
cussed below, the government may want to announce that it will enforce
arbitration agreements only if there is a written opinion from the arbitra-
tor in addition to a decision.
Allyn Enderlyn and Oliver Dziggel indicate that foreign trade ven-
tures in the Czech Republic have the right to arbitration provided for in
agreements under any internationally recognized rules.' 97 The Czech
Chamber of Commerce and Industry has an Arbitration Court, but the
parties may name other arbitrators in their contract instead. Rules of pro-
cedure are proposed by the Board and announced by the Federal Ministry
of Foreign Trade in the Collection of Laws, thus giving arbitration proce-
dures the force of law. Similar policies apply to disputes between joint
ventures and other Czech enterprises. Joint Venture Law also allows the
choice of legal codes other than Czech law. This set of policies seems well
197. AL-LYN ENDERLYN & OrvER C. DziG.EL, CRACKING EAsrERN EUROPE: EVERYrHING
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designed to achieve the goals discussed above with respect to investments
involving foreign firms.
No such provisions exist, however, for arbitration between Czech
firms. The C.FR. initially drafted a code allowing arbitration of disputes
between Czech enterprises, but this provision was not adopted and is not
currently in place. It would be highly useful to adopt such a provision as
soon as possible. Indeed, practicing attorneys in the Czech Republic have
indicated that opportunism is common because of the difficulty of court
enforcement; they have argued that enforcement of private arbitration
clauses would be very useful.
Hungary also allows businesses operating in conjunction with foreign
firms to specify arbitration in their contracts. 198 Nonetheless, contracts
between Hungarian firms do not presently allow for arbitration. This may
be less of a problem than otherwise since Hungarian courts apparently
function fairly well.
Poland seems to have a well-developed arbitration system, and arbitra-
tion provisions can be applied to contracts between domestic firms. Par-
ties are allowed to specify whose law will govern and who will be the
arbitrator of a dispute. The Union of Polish Banks has established an arbi-
tration court for disputes involving banks and their customers. The Polish
economy is currently performing better than any other formerly Commu-
.nist economy. Much of this success is due to the productivity of Polish
domestic firms, since the country has received relatively little foreign
investment.1 99 While all the countries studied have efficient arbitration
rules for dealings with foreign-investors, Poland has the most efficient sys-
tem for contract enforcement involving domestic firms.
Russia also has arbitration provisions for agreements between Russian
and foreign firms. Enforcement is lacking, however. Western legal
experts recommend that all corporate charters include provisions for arbi-
tration. These should include provisions for the arbitrator, the location of
the arbitration, and the body of law to be used. This authority also indi-
cates that "it is typical of the enabling laws of the emerging Eastern and
Central European countries, that only broad outlines are provided in the
statutes-and a great deal is left to negotiations and contractual
agreements."200
Russian courts will not enforce arbitration agreements between
domestic firms. Rather, the courts will hear the dispute de novo if the
arbitration decree is contested. This is consistent with the general
interventionist tendencies of Russian authorities. Russian subsidiaries of
foreign firms, as opposed to joint ventures, are treated like Russian firms,
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(on file with author).
199. Jane Perlez, Poland's New Entrepreneurs Push the Economy Ahead, N.Y. TIMEs, June
20, 1993, at F7.
200. John H. Morton, Documenting a Deal in Eastern Europe: Anatomy of a Russian Joint
Stock Company, E./W. ExEcuTvE GUME, Aug. 1992, at 27-31.
Cornell International Law Journal
and the courts therefore will not enforce arbitration agreements between
these firms and domestic firms. As a result, some foreign firms may form
joint ventures when subsidiaries would be a preferable form of
organization.
Trade associations and Better Business Bureaus, or their equivalent,
can also serve as a source of regulation and contract enforcement. Much
of their power comes through private mechanisms and provision of infor-
mation about reputations. There may be little scope for government
assistance in this effort. Government could possibly certify the association
itself, giving its announcements more force than otherwise. That is, gov-
ernment can guarantee the reputation of the organization that will guar-
antee its members' reputations. Government may also provide some
payment to these organizations to induce them to undertake more careful
investigations than is in the pure private interest of their members. This is
because members will not capture the full value created by the informa-
tion provided, since information is partially a public good. This strategy is
somewhat risky, however, and if it is chosen, governments should have
clear criteria for terminating relationships with associations. Moreover,
restrictions on political activities of chosen associations would also be use-
ful; otherwise government may find itself subsidizing special interest lobby-
ing organizations.
As with other mechanisms, there is a danger of misuse of antitrust law
with respect to trade associations. In particular, it will sometimes be neces-
sary to exclude some firms from the association in order to maintain qual-
ity. Incorrect antitrust law, however, can interpret such exclusion as an
anticompetitive boycott. Moreover, the Russian antitrust law requires that
all such associations be approved by the antitrust authorities.201 This
could make formation of such organizations more difficult. Nonetheless,
correct interpretation will be difficult, as such laws can be used for
anticompetitive exclusion. Such anticompetitive exclusion has apparently
been practiced in Leningrad.20 2
VI. Creation of Efficient Rules
The private mechanisms discussed here can form the basis for an efficient
body of law. This article first discusses the mechanisms for such law crea-
tion, as well as some of the benefits of private law creation. In particular,
private law may have some advantages over public law, at least as practiced
in the United States.
A. Mechanisms
One advantage of the proposed set of institutions, and in particular of the
multilateral institutions, is their propensity to lead to the evolution of effi-
cient rules. Mechanisms that might lead a formal legal system to yield
201. RSFSR, supra note 166, at 7.
202. IMF, supra note 6, at 279.
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efficient rules exist, but these mechanisms possess limited power.20 3 Com-
peting jurisdictions and competition between judges may be the most effi-
cient method of achieving efficient rules quickly.20 4 Indeed, the common
law adopted the Law Merchant in order to obtain the legal business, and
associated fees, of merchants.
When parties are negotiating contracts, they will consider enforce-
ment methods. Generally speaking, breach of a contract will occur only as
a result of unanticipated events, so parties cannot know ex ante the nature
of breach or the desired remedies. Therefore, the interest of parties ex
ante is to choose those arbitrators who will maximize the ex post joint
wealth of the parties-that is, arbitrators who will choose the most effi-
cient rules for enforcement. For example, arbitrators are commonly suc-
cessful businessmen, rather than lawyers, so they are familiar with business
practices and industry customs. If these arbitrators establish rules by
announcing the reasons for their decisions, the rules will tend to be effi-
cient. If they are not, then future disputants will choose different arbitra-
tors. There will thus be strong pressures for arbitrators to use efficient
rules.
Will the arbitrators establish rules, or will they only settle disputes?
Landes and Posner argue that there are sometimes inadequate incentives
for arbitration to produce rules, as opposed to decisions, because the crea-
tion of a rule does not benefit the parties who pay for dispute settle-
ment.20 5 They argue that the parties to a dispute want a settlement of the
dispute, not a rule. The rule is a public good whose private value is less
than the cost to the disputants. Benson has questioned this claim, and
points out that the Law Merchant did produce rules which were later
adopted into the common law. Moreover, Benson suggests that if parties
contract in advance with arbitrators, then arbitrators have an incentive to
clarify the rules they will use in the event of a dispute in order to facilitate
settlement and reduce the number of cases actually arbitrated.206 In the
diamond example, arbitrators do not generally provide rules, but this is
because parties prefer secrecy in this market. More recently, some bourses
have begun publishing rules, but omitting party names.20 7
In fact, Landes and Posner indicate that there are circumstances in
which rules will be created. If the arbitration is performed for an associa-
tion, then rule creation is feasible because the association can collect dues
and use these to pay for rules. The Law Merchant evolved at least in part
in connection with trade fairs (one example is the Champagne Fairs).
Therefore, there was a possibility of creating efficient rules because all par-
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ticipants in the Fairs would have been willing to pay a share for such rule
creations and the organizers could have charged a premium to support
this outcome.208 As suggested above, a useful method to generate rules
would be for the state to agree to enforce arbitration agreements only if
the arbitrator agrees to write an opinion.
For private associations, dues could be used to supplement fees paid
by disputants, thus paying for rule creation and promulgation. The rules
would benefit all association members, not merely those with a dispute at
issue; members would therefore be willing to pay dues to obtain such
rules. We would also expect associations to develop efficient rules.
Associations depend on members for dues. Firms would be more likely to
join associations if the associations credibly promised them efficient rules.
Customary rules used in an industry are a likely source of efficient prece-
dents,209 and the mechanisms identified here are useful to generate for-
mal records of such customs.
B. Characteristics of Private Law
Private law will have other advantages. Although it is impossible to
describe the details of efficient contract law for each country at each point
in time, some broad legal principles can be described. This is particularly
true since American contract law is, in some respects, inefficient, and
these inefficient areas can be identified.
Law can err, in particular, by refusing to enforce voluntarily agreed
upon contract terms. In the United States and elsewhere today, courts
brand certain types of contracts as being "against public policy." Such
contracts may be considered "unconscionable." The courts claim that the
parties had "unequal bargaining power" or that the relevant contracts
were "contracts of adhesion." Such rulings are particularly common in
contracts between individuals and business firms but sometimes apply to
other contracts as well. In these cases, courts will refuse to enforce the
contracts.
None of these doctrines are economically desirable. In all cases, they
make the parties to the transactions worse off.210 Courts have imposed
these doctrines on parties who have signed contracts with provisions that,
ex post (after breach, or after an accident), one of the parties has regret-
ted. If there is private enforcement of contracts, then courts will not
adopt any such inefficient provisions; courts will enforce contracts as writ-
ten. Thus, private enforcement will lead to a more efficient contract law
208. Milgrom et al., supra note 87.
209. Robert D. Cooter, Structural Approach to Adjudicating Social Norms: Evolution of the
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than would public enforcement, if public enforcement follows the U.S.
example.
There are, of course, some inefficient contracts. These are generally
inefficient, however, with respect to third parties. Two examples are con-
tracts to fix prices and contracts to commit a crime. The antitrust laws and
the criminal laws can regulate these sorts of agreements. Moreover, since
such contracts are illegal, the parties would want to keep them secret, and
thus would not rely on the sort of private mechanisms discussed here, even
if these mechanisms could lead to enforcement. Thus, with respect to
those contracts that are economically efficient and socially desirable, there
would likely be some advantages to private enforcement relative to public
enforcement. Indeed, the best approach might be private determination
of liability, as by arbitrators or trade associations, with public enforcement
of the private decrees.
Two-party contracts might be inefficient if one party to the contract is
incompetent. This might apply to contracts with children or with the
mentally incompetent. Contracts will also be inefficient if there is fraud or
duress (where duress is defined as involving force, not "unequal bargain-
ing power"21 1 or "unconscionability"212). The medieval Law Merchant, a
voluntary body of contract law, invalidated a contract based on "fraud,
duress, or other abuses of the will or knowledge of either party."2 13 Thus,
private law should be able to handle these problems of inefficient contract
formation.
VII. Implications
This article provides suggestions for behavior for governments, arbitrators,
private trade associations, private attorneys, and businesses in the post-
Communist economies. This article considers each.
Govminrimrs. For governments, the major implication is that
enforcement of private agreements to arbitrate disputes between domestic
firms, as well as between domestic and foreign firms, is useful and desira-
ble. This simple policy, followed in Poland but not in the other countries,
would be the most powerful device for quickly adapting the dispute resolu-
tion system to a market economy. Government might want to consider
paying a small subsidy to arbitrators if they agree to write opinions, but
this is of secondary importance. If arbitrators begin adopting a set of rules
and precedents, then governments should consider these in revisions of
commercial codes. Governments may also want to make provisions for a
common law type process for the court system during code revisions.
Other government policies have mainly negative implications. Gov-
ernments should refrain from excessive enforcement of antitrust laws,
including regulation of vertical relationships, and laws against deception.
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Western economies established market institutions and developed large
economies before such inefficient law enforcement became fashionable; if
new economies unduly burden themselves with such costly policies,
growth would be retarded or even precluded. Of course, in the case of
Russia, a strengthening of the central government is necessary before gov-
ernment itself can credibly commit to policies facilitating growth.
ARBrrRATORS. If government will enforce arbitration decrees, then
arbitrators can play a major role in the system. An arbitration association
will be rewarded if it announces that it will establish precedents and
decide cases based on these precedents. If this policy is successful, and if
parties begin using this association, then the association might begin to
charge ex ante for being named in contracts as the arbitrator of choice.
Law firms might find providing such arbitration a valuable specialty.
TRADE ASSOCIATIONS. Private trade associations can begin to play an
informational role. Such associations can keep records of behavior of
industry members and make this information available to potential trans-
actors. Those seeking the information can pay a fee covering the costs.
Alternatively, the trade association can charge members for listing; any
firm not listed would signal potential partners that it was unwilling to be
rated by the association. Trade associations can also establish formal arbi-
tration procedures with enforcement through information and reputation
mechanisms. Organizations such as Better Business Bureaus can perform
a similar function for businesses (perhaps retail businesses) in a geo-
graphic location.
Arro~mxs. Private attorneys advising firms can utilize information
regarding reputations as it is generated. Attorneys can also include arbi-
tration clauses in contracts for their clients. Indeed, attorneys could cur-
rently include clauses indicating that arbitration will be used if arbitration
decrees should become enforceable in the future. If certain arbitration
associations begin to generate precedents, and if these seem useful and
efficient, attorneys can name these associations in contracts.
BusmFSSEs. Businesses can utilize all of the information generated by
the processes mentioned above. In addition, certain business behaviors in
post-Communist economies are now outdated and counterproductive.
First, businesses should avoid excessive secrecy. The best way to guarantee
performance is to establish a reputation for fair and honest dealing. Crea-
tion of reputations is, by definition, an activity requiring information shar-
ing, and excessive secrecy can hinder or stop this activity. Second,
businesses should become more accommodating in their bargaining strat-
egies. For agreements to be self-enforcing, both parties must value the
expected future benefits of continuing the sequence of transacting more
than the one-time benefits of cheating. Businesses with long-term hori-
zons should realize this and allow trading partners to make a reasonable
return on the stream of transactions.
While the transition from a planned economy to a market economy
will take a long time, adoption of the policies suggested here can speed up
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the process and also increase wealth, and thus consumer welfare, during
the transition period.

